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ABSTRACT 
A concise statement of the nature of freedom, which 
contains aspects of individual freedom and social freedom, 
can be extracted from the economic discussions that form 
the substance of Karl Marx's Das Kapital (Capital, 'Volume 1'). 
The account of individual freedom involves the concern of 
individuals who want to be free of the interference of 
capital. It is an expanded consideration of non-interference 
associated traditionally with the ideal liberal notion of 
negative freedom, and it has its basis in the universal 
condition of existence where individuals labour in order to 
survive. 
Social freedom is concerned with how individuals 
labour in each changing social form, and in capitalist society 
it is primarily concerned with the lack of freedom of those 
who sell their labour-power in acquiring a fair distribution 
of the benefits and burdens of society. Marx argues that it 
is because of the sale of labour-power that capitalism comes 
into existence, and once the intense accumulation of nineteenth 
century European capitalism is completed then a new social 
form will have to replace capitalism. In Das Kapital Marx 
depends neither on the eventual collapse of capitalism in 
order for individuals to acquire greater freedom in society, 
nor does he propose a positive programme, explainable by 
dialectics, to overthrow capitalism. Instead, he argues 
iii 
that greater freedom develops in society by both reform 
and revolution. 
The argument proceeds as follows: Chapter One 
presents the discussion of freedom in relation to the 
distinction of negative and positive freedom in Isaiah Berlin's 
"Two Concepts of Liberty". Chapter Two considers recent 
criticism of Berlin's notion of negative freedom, and I 
maintain that Marx allows for an expanded consideration of 
negative freedom where individuals are motivated to be free 
of the interference of capital. Chapter Three argues that 
both reform and revolution are vehicles for social change 
in Das Kapital, and Marx doesn't outline a positive 
programme for the future. The final chapter (Chapter Four) 
presents Marx's account of freedom which is based on the 
notions of individual freedom and social freedom. 
Abstract 
Table of Contents 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER ONE: 
CHAPTER Th'O : 
CHAPTER THREE: 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
Bibliography 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ii 
iv 
1 
BERLIN AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 16 
A. The Notion of Negative Freedom 16 
B. The Notion of Positive Freedom 26 
MARX AND NEGATIVE FREEDOM 37 
A. The Notion of Negative Freedom 
Exoanded 37 
B. Marx 1 s Basis for Non-Interference 42 
C. Marx and Individual Motivation 49 
D. Non-Interference from Capital 60 
MARX AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
A. Marx and Positive Freedom 
B. Marx and Dialectics 
C. Reform and Revolution 
MARX 1 S ACCOUNT OF FREEDOM 
A. Introduction 
B. Individual Freedom 
C. Social Freedom 
D. Conclusion 
70 
70 
75 
82 
94 
94 
96 
101 
110 
113 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
The specific concern of this thesis is to 
present a concise statement of the nature of freedom 
I 
in Karl Marx's Das Kapital (Capital, 'Volume 1'). 
The claim that Marx's writings contain a 
detailed consideration of freedom isn't new, for attempts 
have been made, especially in recent times, to assert the 
overriding importance of freedom in his thought. At least 
two different apprc·aches have been offered, one by Peter 
Singer and another by Loyd D. Easton. 
Singer's briEf and informative work Karl Marx 
presents the theme of freedom as Marx's "central concern 
[for] Marx was devoted to the cause of human freedom" 
both in his actions and in his thought. 1 Singer says 
that Marx's vision of frEedom can be traced from his 
doctoral dissertation, through his revolutionary 
activities in Germany and France, his many writings on 
politics and economics, and his organizational efforts 
on behalf of various workers' movemencs. In his summary 
Press, 
1Peter Singer, Karl Marx (Oxford University 
1980), pp. 68-72. 
2 
Singer proposes that the precise nature of Marx's consid-
eration of freedom rests on Marx's discussion of the future 
stage of communism which, according to Singer, "would 
bring with it the end of any threat of a conflict between 
the freedom of the community to control its own economic 
and social life, and the freedom of the individual to do 
. 2 
as he or she pleases." Singer, however, offers little 
elaboration of the vision of freedom that he attributes 
to Marx. 
Easton's essay "Marx and Individual Freedom" 
emphasizes Marx's early texts and argues that because 
of the influence of German idealist philosophy, especially 
that of G.W.F. Hegel, Marx defends individual freedom "as 
a matter of philosophical principle and specific social 
policy." 3 In his response to the question of freedom in 
Marx's writings, Easton argues that there are "unresolved 
problems and gaps" in Marx's account of individual 
freedom. 4 Easton's position is that Marx adheres "to 
dialectics as the fundamental principle of 'development' 
in society and history, a~~ this was the permanent 
ground of his defense of individual freedom." 5 Easton 
2 ib·d 72 --~--' p. . 
3 Loyd D. Easton, "Marx and Individual Freedom", 
The Philosophical Forum, Volume Xll, Number 3 (Boston: 
Boston University, 1981), p. 193. 
4
·b·d 210 ~ ~ ., P· . 
5
·b·d ~ ~ . ' p. 193. 
3 
contends that Marx "never freed himself from the purely 
rational aspect of Hegel's method [for] Marx's use of 
dialectics entails a thoroughgoing monism, effectively 
cancelling all individuality ... and consequently any 
real pluralism and change." 6 
Easton's position can only be attributed to Marx 
if one assumes that Marx's use of dialectics entails that 
all change and development in society and history is 
inevitable along dialectical lines. Then, such an 
interpretation of Marx's philosophy lends itself to the 
monist position that Easton accords to Marx's philosophy 
but it comes abouc only by a strict adherence to limited 
aspects of Marx's analysis of social and historical change. 
It is a position that doesn't give sufficient weight to 
Marx's discussions in Das Kapital on the nature of social 
change or the role of individual motivation in effecting 
change. 
ll 
The approaches which Singer and Easton offer are 
jnadequate considerations of Marx's account of freedom 
6
·b·d l l 0 ' p. 210. 
4 
primarily because their brief analyses don't give a 
detailed discussion of freedom in Das Kapital. I shall 
go beyond their examinations, first, by concentrating 
the discussion of Marx's philosophy of freedom to 
Das Kaoital and, second, by concentrating the discussion 
of freedom to that perspective of political freedom offered 
by the distinguished Oxford scholar Isaiah Berlin in his 
essay "Two Concepts of Liberty". 
There are aspects of Marx's philosophy in both his 
earlier and later works which have a bearing on his account 
of freedom but, with respect to the first consideration of 
my approach, the central importance of Das Kapital in the 
corpus of Marx's writings, as well as the refinement of 
his thought found in it, allow for an account of freedom 
to be extracted from this specific and detailed economic 
study. Although reference will be made occasionally to 
some of Marx's other writings, such reference is intended 
to clarify my interpretation of Marx's view of freedom 
in Das Kapital. 
Marx doesn't state explicitly what he means by 
freedom in Das Kapital but he does present enough direction 
in economic discussions to support the standpoint of this 
thesis, namely, that a concise statement of Marx's account 
of freedom can be extracted from Das Kapital. The text 
remains Marx's central work, the labour of almost twenty-
five years, and culminates a lifetime of thought and 
5 
. 7 act~on. Any consideration, therefore, of Marx's 
philosophy should be supported by extensive reference 
to it. 
Das Kapital discloses the importance of capital 
in society, and how and why capital has attained such 
importance. Only in b~ief, though often ambiguous, passages 
does Marx attempt to relate the movement of capital to the 
question of freedom. Such an approach doesn't lessen the 
importance of freedom in Das Kapital; it only makes it 
harder to present a clear and concise statement of what 
Marx means by freedom. Even when Marx provides historical 
support for his economic position in the eighth and 
concluding part, there are difficulties in extracting his 
underlying position on the nature of freedom. In particular, 
he refers to the historical support as a 'supposition'S 
and he proposes that the resolution in a future social 
form of the accumulation of capital is only a 9 'tendency' . 
I maintain, however, that both his supposition and the 
tendency of capital accumulation are of considerable 
importance to his account of freedom, for Marx doesn't 
7Singer, Marx, pp. 23 , 28. 
8Karl Marx, Capital 'Volume 1', trans. Samuel Moore 
and Edward Aveling, ec~ted by Frederick Engels (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1978), p. 667. Hereafter DK. 
9
·b·d 713 ~ ~ ., P· . 
6 
confine his discussion to a strictly scientific expl-
anation of individual actions and social events. Instead, 
he presents a truly profound ex pression of man as he 
lives in s ociety. 
With respect to the second consideration of my 
approach, the difficulty in explaining the nat·ure of 
• 
freedom is by no means confined to the approaches 
offered by Singer and Easton but it is embedded in any 
attempt to d i scuss tre nature of freedom - a difficulty 
which Berlin declares is true of almost every writer 
who discusses freedom. In "Two Concepts of Liberty" 
Berlin states: "Like happiness and goodness, like Nature 
and reality, the meaning of the term is so porous that 
there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist."10 
There are, Berlin says, "more than two hundred senses of 
this protean word recorded by historians of ideas", and 
in order to overcome such an inherent difficulty in 
discussions of freedom Berlin limits his consideration 
of freedom to two senses in which the problems of freedom 
are generally discusses in political philosophy, and which 
he cla~ms are "central" to the discussion of freedom. 11 He 
(Oxford 
10Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty 
University Press, 1979), p. 121. Hereafter FEL. 
ll;b'd 121 
..... ~ ., P· . 
7 
comments: "The first of these political senses of 
freedom or liberty (I shall use both words to mean the 
same) , (following much precedent) I shall call the 
'negative' sense .... The second I shall call the 
•t• ,.12 pos~ ~ve sense. The negative notion of freedom is 
freedom from interference in the sense of the individual 
being able to do this or that without being interfered 
with by others, while the positive notion of freedom is 
freedom to in the sense "to lead one prescribed form 
of life."13 
Berlin is critical of the positive theory of 
freedom which he sees as put forward by Hegel, Marx, and 
others. The main focus of his criticism is the gross 
distortion of freedom that is perpetrated in the name of 
. . f d 14 pos~t~ve ree om. Berlin says that some writers have 
"obscured" the understanding of freedom which Marx and 
others have proposed "and at times transformed it into 
•t . ,.15 ~ s oppos~te. The thrust of Berlin's argument is that 
freedom in the positive sensE is inadequate. He chastizes 
those who promote such a viewpoint for speculating on a 
utopian "condition of perfect social harmony [which] is 
the play of idle fancy." 16 Berlin discounts positive 
12.b.d ~ ~ . ' pp. 121/2. 
13.b.d ~ ~ . ' pp. 130/1. 
14.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· lxi. 
lS.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. lxi. 
16.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 118. 
8 
political ideas and ideologies because they deny what he 
sees as the most important consideration of political 
liberty, namely the furtherance of negative freedom, or 
the freedom of individuals from interference so that they 
can do what they want, within certain boundaries, without 
being coerced by those. who promote a particular ideology 
17 
or form of government to which they must conform. 
Berlin claims that the freedom of individuals to 
choose between a pluralism of values "with the measure 
of 'negative' liberty that it entails, seems ... a truer 
and more humane ideal that the goals of those who seek in 
the great, disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal 
of 'positive' self-mastery by classes, or peoples, or the 
whole of mankind."18 To this end, Berlin is critical of 
Marx's phllosophy because it lends itself to a 'monism' 
that begins as a doctrine of freedom but is "turned into 
a doctrine of authority and, at times, of oppression, 
and became the favoured weapon of despotism, a phenomenon 
11 f .1. . d "19 a too aml lar ln our own ay. 
Berlin's argument has been only briefly presented, 
for his position is a detailed and involved consideration 
of freedom. In the following chapter his argument will 
17.b.d l l . ' p. 118. 
18.b.d l l . ' P· 171. 
19.b.d l l . ' p. xliv. 
9 
be presented in more depth and it will be used as a 
basis upon which to discuss the relation of Marx's 
philosophy to it in subsequent chapters. Although it will 
be proposed that individual freedom and social freedom are 
more adequate formulations of freedom in Marx's philosophy, 
it shouldn't be assume9 that my discussion will parallel 
the notions of individual and negative freedom, and social 
and positive freedom. Individual and social freedom 
differ substantially from Berlin's account of negative and 
positive freedom, and the initial task will be to present 
the relation of Marx's philosophy to Berlin's position 
before I endeavour to state Marx's account of freedom. 
To this end, I shall argue that Berlin's 
consideration of Marx's account of freedom is inadequate. 
Marx allows for a degree of individual discretion upon 
which individuals can decide whether they will remain 
confined to a particular social form, especially the one 
dominated by capital, and Berlin doesn't account for such 
discussion. There is the further aspect of my interpretation 
of Marx's philosophy which won't ignore Easton's emphasis 
on dialectics and Hegel's influence, but the major emphasis 
will be to explore the economic perspective which Marx 
maintains in Das Kapital, and I shall view social and 
historical change, a nd the effects of such change on the 
individual, within that perspective. In effect, I shall 
10 
argue for a 'pluralism' in Marx's philosophy that over-
rides the arguments of Easton and Berlin, but which is 
based on Marx's treatment of the individual, and social 
change in Das Kapital. Despite my disagreement, especially 
with Berlin's position, his concentration of discussions 
of freedom to politic~l freedom, as well as recent criticisms 
of his position, will allow me to develop my interpretation 
of Marx's account of freedom. 
One further note has to be made on the approach of 
this thesis. My discussion of Marx's account of freedom 
in Das Kapital will not offer an interpretation of what 
Marx means by the traditional issue of free will. 
Das Kapital is a discussion of capital and his account of 
freedom that can be extracted from it will be based on 
how the individual acts or has the ability to act in 
capitalist society. Marx doesn't discuss directly the 
nature of an individual's will independently of the individu-
a l~ existence in society. I can only agree with Berlin's 
remark that "much more needs to be done, especially on the 
issue of free will" 20 ; and, that in what follows the 
issue of free will will not be explicitly discussed. 
20.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. lxiii. 
11 
111 
The basis of my interpretation of the nature of 
freedom in Das Kapital will rest on the distLnction 
between labour and labour-power, and the consequence of this 
distinction on Marx's account of individual freedom and , 
social freedom. 
An analysis of the distinction of labour and 
labour-power is offered by Robert Heilbroner in his work 
Marxism: For and Against. Heilbroner says: "Labor 
power is the capacity for work that an employer buys 
when he hires a worker for a day or a week. Labor, on 
the other hand, is the actual expenditure of human energy 
and intelligence that becomes embodied in the commodities 
that laborers create." 21 According to Heilbroner, the 
importance of the difference between labour and labour-
power for Marx's economic theory is underlined by the fact 
that "one must always be able to buy the capacity for work 
for less than the value that will be created when that 
22 
capacity is put to use and commodities are produced." 
Heilbroner explains that it is because "this difference 
exists that capital itself can be brought into being." 23 
21 Robert L. Heilbroner, Marxism: For and Against 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1980), p. 107. (His emphasis.) 
22.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
23.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
p. 107. 
p. 107. 
12 
Although I agree with Heilbroner's assessment 
that there is an important difference between labour 
and labour-power, I make one qualification to his 
distinction. Labour has existed before capital and 
even before the production of commodities. Marx explains 
that a "thing can be useful, and the product of human 
labour, without being a commodity." 24 
Marx advocates individual freedom to be the 
freedom of each and every individual to appropriate, 
through his or her labour, the things of Nature so 
as to satisfy his or her existence. It is because 
of the universal condition to labour that, one, 
individuals become dissatisfied with interference in 
how they labour and, two, individuals can discriminate 
that it isn't others but conditions such as the domination 
of capital that is the cause of that interference in 
capitalist society. 
Marx's account of social freedom accepts 
the premise that capitalism isn't the everlasting 
form of society. Society has changed its social form 
from tribalism to feudalism to capitalism, and Marx 
argues that it will continue to change its form. The 
24 DK., p. 48. 
p 
13 
underlying feature of capitalism is that individuals 
sell their labour-power to the few owners of capital. 
Marx argues that greater freedom for more people in 
society would be evident if labour-power is used 
for the benefit of society and not simply for the 
sake of the accumulation of capital. Greater 
i 
alteration for more and more non-interference from 
capital, and hence more freedom, is obtainable if 
individuals join together with as many or all 
members of society to alter conditions such that 
the interference which capital creates is reduced 
or eliminated. Marx suggests that by reform and 
revolution individuals are striving for greater 
freedom than exists in society under the domination 
of capital. 
It will be argued that Das Kapital 
contains an account of freedom which has aspects 
of both individual freedom and social freedom. 
Individual freedom consists of the immediate concern 
of individuals who are motivated by their labour to 
be free of the interference which capital creates. 
The universal condition to labour provides the 
basis for individual freedom. Individuals, 
however, can only realize their individual freedom 
14 
in how they have to live and work in society, and 
this involves social freedom which, in respect to 
capitalist society, involved a consideration of 
how the benefits and burdens are shared. The 
distinctive feature of capitalism is that 
individuals create capitalism by the sale of their 
labour-power, and with the progressive development 
of society the changes in the use of labour-power 
will also change society and the freedoms contained 
in it. There is the added consideration of social 
freedom that once society attains a new form, there 
will be further freedoms that some unforeseen future form 
of society will indicate and individuals will have to 
judge their actions according to the kind of freedom 
that they will want in that future society. 
lV 
The approach of the argument is as follows: 
Chapter One outlines Berlin's discussion of political 
liberty and the two notions of negative and positive 
freedom. Chapter Two, first, presents recent criticism 
of Berlin's distinction; second, it is argued that 
Marx considers negative freedom in an expanded context 
15 
to be part of his philosophy; and, third, it is explained 
that individuals are motivated to realize greater freedom 
in society. Chapter Three presents an examination of 
Marx's use of dialectics and his discussion of reform 
and revolution. It is argued that Marx's account of 
freedom shouldn't be viewed as a positive doctrine 
for the realization of greater freedom. Chapter Four, 
the conclusion, presents Marx's account of freedom as 
resting on the two aspects of individual and social 
freedom. 
CHAPTER ONE 
BERLIN AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 
A. The Notion of Negative Freedom 
Berlin investigates the nature of political 
liberty and to this end he distinguishes two notions 
of freedom, namely negative freedom and positive freedom. 
This section will deal with the notion of negative freedom 
or, as Berlin explains, political liberty in the sense 
that there is an "area within which a man can act 
1 
unobstructed by others." 
Berlin gives a brief summary of the notion of 
negative freedom and the importance of non-interference 
when he explains "I am normally said to be free to the 
degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my 
activity." 2 Individuals shouldn't be interfered with, 
coerced, or obstructed in their relations with others. 
"Coercion," Berlin says, "implies the deliberate 
interference of other human beings within the area in 
which I could otherwise act." 3 He explains that 
1 122. FEL., P· 
2
·b·d l l . ' p. 122. 
3
·b·d l l • ' p. 122. 
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coercion is deliberate interference whether it be 
physical, economic, or political. "The criterion of 
oppression," Berlin explains, "is the part that I 
believe to be played by other human beings, directly 
or indirectly, in fustrating my wishes. By being 
free in this sense I mean not being interfered with by 
others. ,A The criterion for greater freedom is as 
follows: "The wider the area of non-interference 
5 the wider my freedom." 
In order to clarify his view Berlin undertakes an 
examination of discussions in various political phil-
osophies on the issue of non-interference. His initial 
remarks deal with the disagreement amongst political 
philosophers on the determination of the area of non-
. f 6 ~nter erence. Because of the impossibility of having a 
totally unlimited area of non-interference for everyone, 
the result has been the position that a minimum area has 
to be set, and upheld by law. 7 He cites Locke, Mill, 
Constant, and Tocqueville as believing that "there 
ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom 
which must on no account be violated." 8 The problem, 
4
·b·d ~ ~ . ' P· 123. 
5
·b·d ~ ~ . ' P· 123. 
6
·b·d ~ ~ . ' p. 123. 
7
·b·d ~ ~ . ' PP· 123/4. 
8
·b·d ~ ~ . ' P· 124. 
p 
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however, that has arisen repeatedly in these discussions, 
is where to draw the boundaries to this area. Berlin 
asserts that wherever one draws the boundary it would 
have to guarantee a realm of freedom that is identical 
with the freedom of all other people. 
Berlin underscores the difficulty in providing 
all of mankind with the same minimum area of non-inter-
ference through an example of people in different 
societies having different material and social needs. 
"The Egyptian peasant," he illustrates, "needs clothes 
or medicine before, and more than personal liberty, but 
the minimum freedom that he needs today, and the greater 
degree of freedom that he may need tomorrow is not some 
species of freedom peculiar to him, but identical with 
that of professors, artists, and millionaires." 9 Berlin's 
illustration highlights a major problem in discussions 
of freedom in political theory for freedom is often 
confused with other social or political goals that are seen 
by mankind as being of equal social value, for example, 
justice or equality. 10 Berlin wishes to avoid such 
confusion in discussions of freedom. Although neither 
freedom, justice, nor equality is the only goal of mankind 
9
·b·d 1. 1. • ' 
10.b.d 
1. 1. • ' 
pp. 124/5. 
p. 125. 
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he goes on to say that if liberties are sacrificed for 
equality or justice, and such sacrifices "do not 
materially increase the individual liberty of others, 
an absolute loss of liberty occurs."11 
Berlin's perspective remains with the obstacle 
that in the interests of such values as justice or 
equality a decision often has to be made such that "the 
freedom of some must at times be curtailed to secure the 
freedom of others."12 The problem in providing a basis 
for such a decision has been the difficulty in political 
theory of reconciling various views of human nature and 
human interests with the area of non-interference of 
each and every individual. Berlin says that writers as 
diverse in theory as Locke, Smith, Mill, Hobbes, 
Jefferson, Burke, Paine, and Lassalle have sought to 
answer this difficulty. 13 They have attempted to define 
clearly in one form or another the minimum area of 
individual freedom. Therefore, there is a common 
underlying feature of those who search for compatib-
ility of their view of man with their conviction of some 
area of non-interference, and that common feature 
according to Berlin is that they refer to liberty in 
11.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. 125. 
12.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 126. 
13.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. 126. 
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the sense of "liberty from; absence of interference 
beyond the shifting, but always recognizable, frontier." 14 
In the "Introduction" to Four Essays on Liberty 
where Berlin expands upon his original essay "Two Concepts 
of Liberty" he provides further elaboration of the 
difficulties with interpretations of the notion of 
' negative freedom. One difficulty is that negative freedom 
has to mean more than actual freedom from coercion. 
Berlin asserts: "The extent of my social or political 
freedom consists in the absence of obstacles not merely 
to my actual, but to my potential choices - to my acting 
in this or that way if I choose to do so."15 Oppression 
comes about with the deliberate intention by persons or 
groups to foster obstacles to either my actual or 
potential choices. 16 Berlin, therefore, doesn't wish to 
equate freedom or the obstruction to freedom solely with 
the actual activity of individuals. Freedom, he says, 
rests with "the right and freedom to act" and not merely 
acting as such. 17 It is the importance of having both the 
right and freedom to act which comprises that part of the 
14.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 127. 
15.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· xl. 
16.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· xl. 
17.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· xliii. 
21 
human conditon which needs to make choices. Berlin 
explains "that there are many possible courses of action 
and forms of life worth living, and therefore to choose 
between them is part of being rational or capable of 
moral judgment."18 Man, then, has to have a minimum 
area of non-interference in which to make such choices, 
I 
19 
especially where values clash. 
A second difficulty which is mentioned in the 
the original essay but which is expanded upon in the 
"Introduction" is that freedom shouldn't be confused 
with the conditions for freedom. 20 The example Berlin 
uses on this point is the need for a universal or uniform 
system of education as a necessary component for tbe 
eventual furtherance "of C•pportunities for free choice, 
which equality in education is likely to increase." 21 
The principle, he explains, for such an ideal may be 
social equality, but it may infringe upon the freedom 
for a minority of people to promote their own system 
of education, for example, an elitist form of education 
that would be tailored to, for, and by the rich. 22 In 
the end choices have to be made between freedcm and its 
18.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· li. 
19.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. liv. 
20.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· liii. 
21.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· liv. 
22.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· liv. 
22 
conditions, and again Berlin refers to the situation 
of conflicting social values. There are no ultimate 
values on which to depend when freedom conflicts wi.th 
other values, but neither is there the need to downgrade 
freedom. The resolution of any clash shouldn't lead to 
a distortion of freedom such that there is a decrease 
f 
. f d f . d. . d 1 23 ~n ree om or ~n ~v~ ua s. 
Berlin explains his position by contrast~ng it 
with the opposite view that values ultimately are 
reconciled under one overriding principle: 
The notion that there must exist objective 
answers to normative questions, truths that can 
be demonstrated or directly intuited, that it is 
in principle possible to discover a harmonious 
pattern in which all values are reconciled, and 
that it is towards this unique goal that Ne must 
make; that we can uncover some single central 
principle that shapes this vision, a principle 
which, once found, will govern our lives - this 
ancient and almost ur.iversal belief, on which 
so much traditional thought and action and 
philosophical doctrine rests, seems to me invalid, 
and at times to have led (and still to lead) to 
~bsurdit~es ~a theory and barbarous consequences 
~n pract~ce. 
In order to counteract the possible 'barbarous' tendencies 
that may be experienced with the objectification of some 
particular standard of man, Berlin proposes an inherent 
rationality in each and every individual "to follow the 
the course of conduct which least obstructs the general 
23.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
24.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
pp. liv/lv. 
pp. lv/lvi. 
23 
pattern of life in which we believe." 25 There are no 
clear and precise rules or principles to follow for 
"conditions are often unclear, and principles incapable 
of being fully analyzed or articulated. 
adjust the unadjustable, we do the best 
We seek to 
we can."
26 
Berlin reiterates that people shouldn't "be 
blinded to the possible danger of the total triumph of 
. . 1 ,.27 any one pr~nc~p e. 
with its conditions: 
Nor, should freedom be confused 
Those who are obsessed by the truth that negative 
freedom is worth little without sufficient cond-
itions for [its] active exercise, or without the 
satisfaction of other human aspirations, are liable 
to minimize its importance, to deny it the very 
title of freedom, to transfer it to something 
that they regard as more precious, and finally to 
to forget that without it hum~n life, both social 
and individual, withers away. 8 
One of Berlin's major concerns is to protect the 
individual against paternalism, in whatever shape or form, 
whereby it is someone else, or some group or government, 
which dictates what is rational for the individua1. 29 
The rationale for this position is the belief that there 
are neither absolute definitions of man's nature, nor 
on the matter of freedom can there be any absolute 
determinations of what freedom means for man. Berlin 
25.b.d ~., 
26.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
p. 1 v. 
p. 1 v. 
27.b.d ~ ~ ., p. lviii. 
28.t.d ~ I ~ • ' pp. lviii/lix. 
29.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. lxii. 
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doesn't form his own complete view of man, possibly 
because of his reservation that once a definite view is 
ascertained, then theories and objective standards 
could emerge from that view. There are those in the past 
that have used either theories of man or standards to 
which mankind should strive for 'barbarous consequences', 
but Berlin also sees examples of this in those discussions 
of freedom where some have attempted to impose one inter-
pretation of freedom upon everyone else; that is, the 
attempt has been made to make a standard upon which to 
direct the behaviour of all men. In particular, 
Berlin makes reference to the "disastrous implications" 
of totalitarian governments over the past one hundred 
years, 30 and the "social doctrine" of many governments. 31 
Berlin places a high priority, if not the highest, 
on liberty, although it has to be kept in mind that he 
doesn't want to make negative freedom an absolute principle 
32 
any more than any other. A doctrine purporting to be a 
doctrine of freedom has to guard against distortions of 
individual freedom. 33 The individual still has to be 
left with the free determination provided by a minimum 
30.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. xlvii. 
3l.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. lvii. 
32.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. lx. 
33.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· lxi. 
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area of non-interference and the freedom to choose between 
conflicting values and not to have those values imposed 
34 
on the individual by others. 
In a discussion of J.S. Mill's concern for the 
individual, Berlin attempts to clarify the relationship 
of the individual and negative freedom. The defence of 
, 
liberty "consists in the 'negative' goal of warding off 
interference." 35 Berlin states that it is important for 
both his and Mill's view of man, indeed for any modern 
interpretation of man, for this negative goal to be 
maintained. "To threaten a man," Berlin elaborates, 
"with persecution unless he submits to a life in which 
he exercises no choices of his goals; to block before 
him every door but one, no matter how noble the prospect 
upon which it opens, or how benevolent the motives of 
those who arrange this, is to sin against the truth that 
he is a man, a being with a life of his own to live." 36 
Although Berlin grants that his view of the individual 
is often disputed, it remains for him the most basic 
conception of man upon which any discussion of individual 
liberty must be based. 37 
34.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. lxii. 
35.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. 127. 
36.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 127. 
37.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 128. 
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B. The Notion of Positive Freedom 
Berlin gives an extended explanation of what under-
lies, in his opinion, the notion of positive freedom. 
"The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty', he says 
derives from the wish on the part of the individual 
to be his own· master. I wish my life and decisions 
to depend on myself, not on external forces of 
whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my 
own, not of other men's, acts of will. I wish to 
be a subject, not an object; to be moved by 
reason, by conscious purposes, which are my own, 
not by causes which affect me, as it were, from 
outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a 
doer - deciding, not being decided for, self-
directed and not acted upon by external nature 
or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, 
or a slave incapable of playing a human role; 
that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my 
own and realising them. That is, at least part 
of what I mean when I say that I am rational, and 
that it is my reason that distinguishes me as a 
human being from the rest of the world. I wish, 
above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, 
willing, active being, becoming responsible for my 
choices and able to explain them by reference to 
my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the 
degree that I believe this to be true, and 
enslaved to the ~egree that I am made to realise 
that it is not.3 
Berlin explains that the freedom of self-mastery contained 
in the notion of positive freedom might not appear all 
that different from the freedom of non-interference 
contained in the notion of negative freedom, but the 
two have "historically developed in divergent directions." 39 
38.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
39.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
p. 131. 
p. 132. 
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The former forms the basis of those who support the 
notion of positive freedom, and the latter forms the 
basis of those who support the notion of negative freedom. 
Berlin has a particular reservation about the nature 
of positive freedom because it rests on the philosophical 
position of the divided self; that is, there are two selves 
in the one individual - the dominant rational self which 
dictates to a lower animal or natural self. 40 He says 
that "the positive conception of freedom as self-mastery, 
with its suggestion of a man divided against himself, has, 
in fact ... lent itself more easily to this splitting 
of personality into two: the transcendent, dominant 
controller, and the empirical bundle of desires and 
41 passions to be disciplined and brought to heel." The 
major criticism which Berlin makes of such a position is 
that the positive conception of freedom, based on inter-
pretations of man's rational self, is ruthlessly dictated 
to others. These interpretations can be made by 
individuals, but they are made most often by groups of 
individuals and these groups eventually dictate a rational 
norm to which all individuals must conform. Freedom, 
generally, in this sense becomes nothing more than a 
manipulative term to be used at the discretion of the 
40.b'd 
l l . ' 
41.b'd l l . ' 
p. 132. 
p. 134. 
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manipulator. "Enough manipulation," Berlin explains, 
"with the definition of man, and freedom can be made to 
mean whatever the manipulator wishes."42 
Berlin illustrates how individuals can be 
manipulated by either self-abnegation or self-realization. 
First, he deals with the concept of self-abnegation, or 
the retreat of the individual into his inner rational 
43 
self. It is the position that man is helpless in the 
face of the trials and difficulties of life. "In a world," 
Berlin says, "where a man seeking happiness or justice or 
freedom ... can do little, because he finds too many 
avenues of action blocked to him, the temptation to 
withdraw into himself may become irresistable. rr44 He 
explains that this is "the traditional self-emancipation 
of ascetics and quietists, of stoics or Buddhist sages 
45 
... who have fled the world." Such people maintain 
"that what I cannot have I must teach myself not to 
desire; that a desire eliminated, or successfully 
resisted, is as good as a desire satisfied.',46 
Berlin doesn't agree with self-abnegation or with 
42.b.d 
l l . ' P· 134. 
43.b.d 
l l . ' pp. 134, 139. 
44.b.d 
l l • ' P· 139. 
45.b.d 
l l . ' p. 135. 
46.b.d 
l l . ' P· 139. 
> 
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the definition of negative freedom offered by Mill "as 
the ability to do what one wishes."47 Wishes can often 
be manipulated either by the individual or a ruler to 
satisfy some end or purpose that isn't the individual's 
own. The individual can be made to 'feel free' even under 
tyranny by the suppression or conditioning of desires, 
but the so-called freedom that results isn't political 
48 freedom. The individual may 'feel free' but in terms 
of his political life he doesn't enhance his freedom by 
self-abnegation. Berlin explains: "to know one's chains 
is often the first step to freedom, which may never come 
about if one either ignores or loves them."49 He is 
adamant that self-abnegation cannot be freedom: "The sense 
of freedom ... entails not simply the absence of fustration 
... but the absence of obstacles to possible choices and 
activities." 50 Berlin, however, offers little elaboration 
on an alternative to self-abnegation other than the 
proposal that the individual, by his own actions, can 
overcome obstacles by removing them, even if force or 
persuasion is used. "Such acts," Berlin says, "may be 
unjust, they may involve violence, cruelty, the enslavement 
47 . b.d ~ ~ . ' p. 139. 
48.b.d ~ ~ . ' pp. 139/40. 
49.b.d ~ ~ ., P· xxxixn. 
so.b.d ~ ~ ., p. xxxix. 
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of others, but it can scarcely be denied that thereby the 
agent is able in the most literal sense to increase his 
own freedom." 51 
The second illustration which Berlin offers as to 
how individuals can be manipulated takes the form of the 
concept of self-realization; that is, individuals can be 
led to believe that "to understand the world is to be 
freed." 52 "Knowledge liberates ... by automatically 
eliminating irrational fears and desires." 53 Berlin 
uses the particular reference of a position which he sees 
is maintained by Marx whom he interprets as saying that 
people have to become aware of the economic, historical, 
and social influences in their lives, and furthermore 
they have to be aware of their position as creators of 
these forces. Such awareness has to happen before change 
can occur. Consequently, Berlin suggests that "for 
M d d . . . . "54 arx, un erstan ~ng ~s appropr~ate actlon. Berlin 
claims that if the individual understands, or is made 
to understand, how certain things come to be, then the 
individual assimilates that understanding into his very 
being! As the individual is rational, he accepts a 
rational understanding of how things come to be. The 
51.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 140. 
52.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 142. 
53.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. 142. 
54.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 143. 
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individual then applies himself to the understanding 
he has accepted. 55 
It is the manipulation of self-realization which 
Berlin examines in the light of contemporary social and 
political developments, and he sees it "at the heart of 
many of the nationalist, communist, authoritarian, and 
, 
totalitarian creeds of our day." 56 According to Berlin, 
such advocates of positive freedom maintain that "the 
problem of political liberty was soluble by establishing 
a just order that would give to each man all the freedom 
to which a rational being was entitled." 57 The just 
order would be of such a nature that all "Rational men 
will respect the principle of reason in each other, and 
lack all desire to fight or dominate one another." 58 
The test of such a principle is formulated as follows: 
"The existence of, or craving for, oppression will be 
the first symptom that the true solution to the problem 
of social life has not been reached." 59 He clearly 
indicates that such a solution hasn't been reached in 
. h . 60 twent1et century soc1ety. 
ss.b.d 1 1 . ' p. 144. 
56.b.d 1 1 . ' p. 144. 
57.b.d 1 1 . ' p. 145. 
58.b.d 1 1 . ' p. 146. 
59.b.d 1 1 . ' p. 146. 
60.b.d 1 1 . ' p. lviii. 
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Berlin places Marx amongst those writers who promote 
either the doctrine of self-realization or who writings 
ultimately lead to a positive doctrine of freedom. 61 
Subsequently, Berlin suggests that there are numerous 
historical examples to show that the view of freedom that 
can be extracted from Marx's writings develops into a 
62 tool of despots. One consideration of this which 
Berlin offers that is relevant to Marx's writings is the 
confusion of individual liberty with that of liberty for 
the 'social whole' . 63 Berlin sees this as a confusion of 
terms, based on the notion of the divided self, where 
individuals either recognize themselves as part of a 
greater body of men, or associate liberty with some goal 
whether it be equality, fraternity, or justice. He feels 
that such confusion blinds some thinkers to talk of 
liberty in terms that don't concern freedom but refer to 
other ideals such as social equality. Although such 
ideals are just, they don't necessarily advance the 
f l .b 64 cause o ~ erty. 
The confusion of ideals is illustrated further 
61.b.d ~ ~ . ' pp. 142-44. 
62.b.d ~ ~ . ' PP· 143/4. 
63.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 158. 
64.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 162. 
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in Berlin's discussion of one specific confusion, that 
of liberty with democracy. He is of the opinion that 
democracy doesn't necessarily lead to greater liberty, 
but that it can quite often, following the example of the 
65 French Revolution, lead to tyranny. For Berlin, the 
power of any sovereign, whether democratic or tyrannical, 
has to be held in check. He takes the opposite view 
of those who wish to posit the democratic ideal as 
ensuring greater freedom. Democracy, Berlin says, doesn't 
necessarily ensure individual liberty. 66 He reverts to 
his stand on negative freedom as a safeguard against 
tyranny whether by the ruthless democrat or the 
benevolent dictator. His claim is that whatever the 
type of society that is established it has to have an 
absolute stand with respect to freedom, namely "a 
society in which there must be some frontiers of 
freedom which nobody should be permitted to cross."67 
Berlin bases the position of an area of non-
interference on two principles which have to be maintained 
iL order to safeguard the freedom of individuals in a 
truly free society. These principles are: 
65.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
66.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
67.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
pp. 162/3. 
p. 130. 
p. 164. 
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first, that no power, but only rights, can be 
regarded as absolute, so that all men, whatever 
power governs them, have an absolute right to 
refuse to behave inhumanely; and, second, that 
there are frontiers, not artifically drawn, 
within which men should be inviolable, these 
frontiers being defined in terms of rules so 
long and widely accepted that their observance 
has entered into the very conception of what it 
is to be a normal human being, and, therefore, 68 
also of what it is to act inhumanely and insanely. 
The normal human being, for Berlin, shares two charact-
eristics with other individuals. One, he has an inherent 
rationality such that he couldn't break these rules 
"without a qualm of revulsion"; and, two, he has as his 
basic rationale to live within boundaries that won't 
cause him to impose his will on another. 69 Here, Berlin 
says, is the sharp contrast between proponents of negative 
freedom and proponents of positive freedom: "The former 
want to curb authority as such. The latter want it 
placed in their own hands." 70 
Berlin highlights his disagreement with positive 
freedom in his concluding discussion on the monist and 
pluralist determination of values. The monist position, 
according to Berlin, favours the doctrine of positive 
freedom for it "rests on the conviction that all the 
positive values in which men have believed must, in the 
68.b.d 
l l • ' P· 165. 
69.b.d 
l l • ' P· 166. 
70.b.d 
l l . ' P· 166. 
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end, be compatible, and perhaps even entail one another." 71 
Monists believe that there are "final solutions", "a 
single criterion", or "simple, all-embracing systems, 
guaranteed to be eternal"; and, that such a single principle 
or ideal underlies man's existence. 72 Berlin views 
both Marx and his followers as monists. 73 
Berlin clearly doesn't agree with the monist 
position. He suggests the alternate pluralist position 
as more in line with his interpretation of freedom. "The 
d f II B 1' . f 1 1' 74 en s o men are many, er ~n says ~n support o p ura ~sm. 
He supports his view with the following comment: "In the 
end men choose between ultimate values; they choose as 
they do, because their life and thoughts are determined 
by fundamental moral categories that are, at any rate 
over large stretches of time and space, a part of their 
being and thought and sense of their own identity; part 
of what makes them human." 75 
Values, Berlin implies, are relative for it is 
unrealistic, even immature, for individuals to search 
76 for guarantees. "Principles," Berlin says, "are not 
71.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 167. 
72.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 170. 
73.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 168. 
74.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 169. 
75.b.d ~ ~ . ' pp. 171/2. 
76 
ibid. ' p. 172. 
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less sacred because their duration cannot be guaranteed 
[for] to demand more than this is perhaps a deep and in-
curable metaphysical need." 77 Hence, proponents of positive 
freedom and their conviction that there must be an absolute 
principle can't satisfy the aspirations of men or society. 
Berlin concludes his essay with a brief comment on 
the relation of negative freedom and capitalism. The hist-
orical origin, he says, ofnegative freedom and the pluralism 
of values concomitant with it are "only the late fruit of 
our declining capitalist civilization." 78 It isn't to be 
understood that Berlin offers a complete endorsement of 
capitalism for in the "Introduction" he is critical of its 
79 
excesses. Although both negative and positive freedom 
are "liable to perversion into the very vice which it was 
created to resist", Berlin is of the opinion that there is 
less chance today to pervert negative freedom. 80 He says 
that "liberal ultra-liberalism", which underlies capit-
ism's early development and excesses "could scarcely be 
said to be a rising force at present."81 Distortions, 
however, of positive freedom are all too common! 
77.b'd ~ ~ . ' p. 172. 
78.b'd ~ ~ . ' P· 172. 
79.b'd ~ ~ . ' PP· xlv/i. 
80.b'd ~ ~ . ' PP· xlvi/ii. 
81.b'd ~ ~ . ' p. xlvi. 
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MARX AND NEGATIVE FREEDOM 
A. The Notion of Negative Freedom Expanded 
The nature of freedom in Das Kapital is based 
on an expanded consideration of negative freedom and 
not a positive notion of freedom as Berlin outlines. 
This chapter will discuss the relation of Marx's view 
of freedom to the notion of negative freedom. 
Charles Taylor investigates the notions of 
negative and positive freedom in his essay "What's 
Wrong with ·Negative Liberty''. The point wh~ch Taylor 
raises is the shortcoming of applying an extreme view 
of negative freedom as the sole criterion of an account 
of freedom. He doesn't agree that the distinction can be 
as sharD as some writers believe, especially when they 
discount positive freedom merely by the totalitarian 
excesses of this century. Taylor finds Berlin's 
position sympathetic, at times, to the sharp distinction 
that extreme proponents of negative freedom draw 
between the notions of negative and positive freedom. 1 
1 Charles Taylor, "V.7hat's Wrong with Negative Liberty", 
The Idea of Freedom, ed. Alan Ryan (Oxford University 
Press, 1979). p. 177. 
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Taylor feels that the distinction has be to examined in 
more depth than is brought out in the deliberations of 
extreme proponents of negative liberty. 2 
According to Taylor, Berlin's position on the 
notion of negative freedom is for an area of non-interfer-
ence for each and every individual while the notion of 
positive freedom is characterized by self-direction or 
self-governing. 3 Taylor, however, claims that non-inter-
ference or "being able to do what one wants can no longer 
be accepted as a sufficient condition of being free" 
because such a position of negative freedom has to build 
into the conception of non-interference some aspect "for 
discriminating authentic and inauthentic desires.'A 
Taylor asks who can determine whether any wish or desire 
for non-interference coincides with the minimum area of 
non-interference? He puts forward the conclusion that 
"the subject himself can't be the final authoritv on the 
question whether he is free; for he cannot be the final 
authority on the question whether his desires are authentic, 
5 
whether they do or do not frustrate his purposes." 
Taylor outlines the prevailing view of proponer.ts 
2
·b·d ~ ~ . ' P· 193. 
3
·b·d ~ ~ . ' P· 177. 
4
·b·d ~ ~ . ' p. 180. 
5
·b·d ~ ·~ . ' P· 180. 
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of negative freedom within the ideal liberal position, 
and one which would apply to Berlin. It is the view that 
values "self-realization, and accepts that it can fail 
for internal reasons, but which believes that no valid 
guidance can be provided in principle by social authority, 
because of human d~versity and originality, and holds that 
the attempt to impose such guidance will destroy other 
necessary conditions of freedom." 6 Taylor argues that 
if scrutinized closely the distinction between negative 
and positive freedom isn't as cut and dried as it is made 
out to be. Taylor summarizes the two steps of his position 
as follows: 
the first moves us from a notion of freedom as 
doing what one wants to a notion whicn discriminates 
motivations and equates freedom with doing what 
we really want, or obeying our real will, or truly 
directing our lives. The second step introduces 
some doctrine purporting to show that we cannot 
do what we really want, or follow our real will, 
outside of a society of a certain canonical form, 
incorporating true self-government.7 
It follows from Taylor's analysis that non-
interference or the absence of external obstacles solely 
by itself is an inadequate conception of freedom. He 
maintains that there has to be some aspect in such 
a conceptualization that discriminates against the 
arbitrary will of every individual being the final 
6
·b"d ~ ~ . ' 
7
"b"d ~ ~ . ' 
p. 181 
p. 181 
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authority on the area of non-interference and allowing 
"no second-guessing of the subject by any one else."8 
There has to be some way to discern the various internal 
as well as external obstacles to one's freedom for the 
question 'who is to assess whether the individual is 
mistaken?' would require some answer. "Hence," Taylor 
say, ''we cannot maintain the incorrigibility of the subject's 
judgements about his freedom, or rule out second-guessing." 9 
If this point is conceded, then, Taylor adds that the first 
step of negative freedom actually involves both the 
self-understanding of one's purposes and the motives 
behind them as well as non-interference or the absence 
of external obstacles. In other words the first step 
10 
requires both negative and positive aspects of freedom. 
The distinction of negative and positive freedom 
and Taylor's analysis of it will be pursued further as a 
preliminary examination to the perspective which this 
thesis will take of Marx's account of freedom. It is 
advocated by Taylor that the distinction of negative 
and positive freedom made by extreme proponents of 
negative freedom is too sharp. He further explains 
that within the realm of negative freedom there is a 
positive aspect of self-realization which isn't accounted 
8
·b"d l l . ' p. 181. 
9
·b"d l l . ' P· 193. 
10.b"d 
l l • ' P· 193. 
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for in their arguments. Taylor doesn't say that Marx's 
philosophy possesses such an expanded version of negative 
freedom that encompasses a positive aspect. On the 
contrary he suggests that Marx's account of freedom is 
confined solely to the second step of his analysis, 
1 tl . t . f . t . f d 11 name y 1e pos~ ~on o pos~ ~ve ree om. 
This thesis will argue that Marx's account of 
freedom shouldn't be limited to the positive aspect of 
freedom that both Taylor and Berlin suggest is Marx's 
position on freedom. To this end, it will be shown that 
Marx does take account of the non-interference associated 
with negative freedom but in a broader context than is 
allowed by Berlin, and a different context than Taylor's 
extended analysis demands. Marx's discussions in Das Kapital 
primarily deal with the influence of capital on the activities 
of individuals, and the implication that individuals are 
motivated by the need for non-interference from the 
confines of capital and capital-dominated society. 
Therefore, in the following sections of this chapter the 
relation of Marx's philosophy in Das Kapital to the 
notion of negative freedom will be investigated. 
1l.b"d ~ ~ ., P· 181. 
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B. Marx and the Basis for Non-Interference 
Marx's account of -non-interference requires a 
consideration of the distinction he draws between labour 
and labour-power. 
Marx's position with respect to labour is that 
individuals have to be able to use their labour to 
satisfy their own want s . Marx explains that labour "is 
exercised with a definite aim, an activity that approp-
riates particular nature-given materials to particular 
12 human wants." Marx elaborates on what he means by 
labour when he says that "man of his own accord starts, 
regulates, and controls the material re-actions between 
himself and Nature" and, he continues, "By thus acting 
on the external world and changing it, he at the same 
time changes his own nature."13 Marx also implies that 
labour allows for the mature development of the 
individual, and that this development occurs in society. 14 
Marx, however, doesn't hold that there is one 
specific social form that is necessary for labour to be 
undertaken, and he doesn't hold that individuals have 
12DK., p. 50. 
13.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
14.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
p. 173. 
p. 83. 
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to realize themselves in a particular social form. 
Although social conditions where man will use his labour 
will change with different social environments, and 
attributes of man's nature will change to meet those 
conditions, the basis of such labour remains constant, 
that is, man will always have to labour if he is to 
survive. It is this point which describes the innermost 
nature of man, the part that "is the everlasting Nature-
imposed condition of human existence, and therefore is 
independent of every social phase of that existence, 
or rather is common to every such phase." 15 
Marx isn't the first writer to place such 
importance on labour; rather, he refines previous 
political and economic theory that builds on the 
importance of labour. The seventeenth century political 
philosopher John Locke discusses the necessity and 
importance of labour in his Two Treatises of Government 
where he refers to labour as 'Adam's curse', that 
because of the fall from the grace of God, man has 
"to work for his living ... to subdue the Earth."16 
Locke continues his description of man's basic nature 
15.b"d ~ ~ . ' p. 179. 
16John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 'Mentor Book', 
1963), Book 1, Section 45, p. 208. 
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to labour with the comment "as long as [man] livest, 
17 
shall thou live by thy Labour." Marx credits Locke 
with being one of the first modern writers on political 
economy and upon whose views much has been absorbed by 
subsequent writers on politics and economics. 18 
However, it isn't di~ectly because of these passages from 
Two Treatises of Government that Marx cices Locke in 
Das Kapital. Mainly, it is because of Locke's economic 
position in Some Considerations on the Consequences of 
the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money 
that Marx discusses Locke's views in Das Kapital. 
In his discussion of the importance of labour, 
Marx also refers to the eighteenth century economist 
Adam Smith, although Marx has a different emphasis t~an 
Smith on labour. In The Wealth of Nations Smith says that 
when man labours he "must always lay down the same portion 
of his ease, his liberty, and his happiness." 19 Marx 
says in a footnote reference that Smith treats labour 
"as the mere sacrifice of rest, freedom, and happiness, 
not as at the same time the normal activity of 
living beings." 20 
17
·b·d 208 ~ ~ ., P· . 
18 DK., p. 368n. 
19Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, ed. Andrew 
Skinner (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 136 
2 0DK. , p. 7 7 . 
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Marx says that Smith's classification of labour 
as a 'sacrifice' is understandable because "he has the 
modern wage-labourer in his eye" and that Smith is actually 
refering to labour-power as a sacrifice. 21 In capitalist 
society Marx says that labour "so far as it manifests itself 
in the value of commodities, consists only as expenditure of 
labour-power." 22 The use of labour-power in capitalist society 
can be viewed as the sacrifice of rest, freedom, and happiness 
but Marx argues that labour as the 'normal activity' of 
individuals, as opposed to an imposed condition, remains 
a permanent condition of man's existence. 
In Das Kapital Marx advances the theme that man 
originally uses his labour to produce goods for consumption, 
but subsequently he produces commodities for limited 
exchange to acquire goods he couldn't produce. Once such 
goods become commodities, exchanged for the commodities 
of other commodity producers, man becomes alienated 
from the production of his own labour "because the 
relation of producers to the sum total of their own 
labour is presented to them as a social relation, exist-
ing not between themselves, but between the products of 
their labour." 23 Such is the case with production in 
Zl.b.d 
l l • ' p. 53n. 
22.b.d 
l l • ' p. 53n. 
23.b.d 
l l . ' p. 7 7. 
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capitalist society. 
The underlying feature of capitalist is that 
man sells his labour-power to the owner of capital 
for a particular time-period, whether for an hour, day, 
or week. Part of the individual's total expenditure of 
'human energy and intelligence' becomes labour-power 
h . h . 1 d b h . 1 . 2 4 Th . 1 . w 1c 1s emp oye y t e cap1ta 1st. e cap1ta 1st 
system has as its basis this purchase of labour-power. 
"The capitalist epoch," Harx says, "is therefore charact-
erised by this, that labour-power takes in the eyes of 
the labourer himself the form of a commodity which is 
his property." 25 Marx explains that labour-power 
26 
consequently becomes wage-labour. Initially, there 
is a primitive stage of independent and isolated 
producers, but the changes brought about by capitalism 
radically reduce man's social independence and isolation 
. d . 27 1n pro UCt10n. In the social transformation to 
capitalism, the vast majority of people are made 
dependent by the sale of part of their labour to a 
social system of production where they do no control 
the goods they produce, that is they become wage-
labourers.28 
24.b"d 1 1 . ' p. 224. 
25.b"d 1 1 . ' p. 167n. 
26.b"d 1 1 . ' p. 167n. 
27 "b. d 1 1 . ' p. 669. 
28.b"d 1 1 . ' p. 536. 
47 
By the sale of labour-power in the process of 
capitalist production, part of the individual's labour 
"has already been alienated from himself ... has been 
appropriated by the capitalist and incorporated with 
capital, [and] it must during the process, be realised 
in a product that does not belong to him." 29 The same 
"process of production is also the process by which the 
capitalist consumes labour-power, the product of the 
labourer is incessantly converted, not only into 
commodities, but into capital, into means of subsistence 
that buy the person of the labourer, into means of 
production that command the producers [i.e., the 
30 labourers]." The wage-labourer, Marx says, 
"constantly produces material ... wealth but in the form 
of capital, of an alien power that dominates and 
exploits him." 31 
Marx says that man has to labour in order to 
survive and that he has to labour regardless of the form 
which society takes. The individual's use of his own 
energy and intelligence, i.e. his labour, is restricted 
by the domination of capital to which the individual must 
sell his labour-power in order to acquire his means of 
29.b.d 
1 1 . ' p. 535. 
30.b.d 
1 1 . ' p. 535. 
3l.b.d 
1 1 . ' p. 535. 
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subsistence. There are two aspeccs of labour-power that 
become embodied in commodities: one, that aspect of 
labour-power in which the individual realizes the 
means of subsistence, i.e. "necessary labour-time", 
and that aspect of labour-power in which a surplus is 
created for the buyer of labour-power, i.e. "surplus 
labour-time". 32 With reference to the individual's 
situation in capitalist society Marx advocates that 
the main function of the expenditure of an individual's 
labour-power should be the 'necessary labour-time' to 
acquire the individual's means of subsistence and that 
the surplus which is created by labour-power should be used 
for the benefit of society. 33 
One of the major problems with capitalism is that 
the owners of capital reap the benefits from the surplus 
which labour-power creates although they don't have to 
sell their own labour-power. The group of capitalists, 
Marx says, "shift the natural burden of labour from its 
own shoulders to those of another layer of society", i.e. 
34 to the wage-labourers. If such a condition is altered 
so that the wage-labourers don't spend as much time 
labouring for the accumulation of capital and the 
32.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 222. 
33.b"d ~ ~ . ' P· 496. 
34.b"d ~ :L • ' P· 496. 
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capitalists also work, then the total work of society 
would be more evenly divided amongst all members of society. 35 
One of the consequences of such a position is that 
individuals would acquire their means of subsistence by 
expending less labour-power, and surplus-labour would be 
used to benefit all of society. I shall give further 
examples of the problems of capitalist society and Marx's 
position with respect to overcoming these problems later 
in this chapter, but before doing so I shall outline how 
Marx allows for individuals to be motivated to correct the 
inequities of capital-dominated society. 
C. Marx and Individual Motivation 
In my comments on Marx's view of labour, it has 
been argued that individuals have capabilities and cap-
acities that are distinctly theirs, despite the powerful 
influence of society; that is, individuals have lives of 
their own to lead. This position is the opposite of that 
which proposes that in Marx's writings man's nature is 
completely determined either by his social relations, 
history, or economics for it proposes that the motivations 
of the individual aren't completely determined, and that 
Marx does enter into discussion of individual motivation 
35.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. 496. 
so 
in his analysis of capital. Although an argument of 
the next chapter will present my position with respect 
to the received view in Marxist circles of the 
inexorability of dialectical laws as the sole explanation 
of Marx's philosophy, my concern in this section is to 
present the position that Marx allows for individuals 
to be motivated to bd free of the interference of capital. 
The position of the individual directing his own 
life and thought is in opposition to the prominent view 
in Russian Marxist circles earlier this century. Joesph 
Stalin's Dialectical and Historical Materialism 
interprets Marx as follows: "the rise of new productive 
forces and of the relations of production corresponding 
to them ... takes place not as a result of the deliberate 
and conscious activity of man, but spontaneously, un-
consciously, independently of the will of man." 36 In 
suoport of his position Stalin refers almost exclusively 
to the "Preface" of A Critique of Political Economy where 
Marx does say much the same thing, although Stalin omits 
to elaborate on one careful qualification which Marx 
makes, that the mcde of production conditions the 
36 Joseph Stalin, Dialectical and Historical 
Materialism (New York: Internat~onal Publ~shers, 1977), 
pp. 40/1. 
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individual only in the most general 37 sense. Production 
is the major factor in how man's life is shaped but it 
isn't the only all-encompassing factor. Part of the 
difficulty in Stalin's position is that the "Preface" 
of A Critique of Political Economy, according to David 
McLellan, has become "often too exclusively" the major 
. t. f M I • f d . d . . fl 38 expos~ ~on o arx s v~ew o pro uct~on an ~ts ~n uence. 
There are other factors that have to be considered for 
Marx's position is definitely not as simplistic or as 
deterministic as Stalin makes it out to be. 
A major point in any consideration of Marx's 
writings has to be the ambiguous nature of some of his 
comments which have led to much discussion on determin-
ism and the confusion that surrounds it. There are 
many examples in Das Kapital of this including Marx's 
reiteration of his comments in the "Preface;• of 
A Critique of Political Economy and the careful qualif-
ication of 'generally' in how the mode of production 
d . . d . . d 1 . 3 9 Th . t . 1 eterm~nes ~n ~v~ ua act~ons. ere ~s one par ~cu ar 
statement in the "Preface" to the first edition of Das 
Kapital which should adequately being out this point 
37 David McLellan, Karl Marx: Selected Writings 
(Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 389. 
38
·b·d 388 ~ ~ ., P· . 
39DK., p. 86n. 
52 
about ambiguity more clearly, and the consequence of such 
ambiguity on his philosophy. Marx says that the individual 
isn't responsible for social relations "whose creature 
he socially remains, however much he may subjectively 
raise himself above them. ,,40 Despite the impression of 
a strict determinism ~hat this passage offers, there is 
a problem with it. John McMurtry outlines in his recent 
essay "Is There a Marxist Personal Morality?" the 
reservation he has to this statement: 
It is important that Marx in the very passage 
that he denies the individual's responsibility 
for capitalist relations, affirms the subjective 
freedom of the same individual to 'raise himself 
above' them. This qualification is rarely, if 
ever, noted, but it has a crucial consequence. 
If the individual is subjectively free, he may 
form any moral intention whatever though only 
some such intentions will be practically 
realizable within the economic relations to 
which he is subject. Herein lies the 'elective 
space' required by personal morality, and 
accorded to the individual by Marx himself in 
his most deterministic utterance.41 
McMurtry's view and the reservation about the often-
quoted passage in the "Preface" of A Critique of Politicl 
Economy have been presented so as to explain that economic 
determinism isn't all-encompassing for Marx. I have argued 
that Marx doesn't propose that the ind~vidual is deter-
mined completely by economic relations, although it has 
40.b.d l_ ,_ ., p. 21 
~-1 1 John McMurtry, "Is There a Marxist Persona 
Morality?", Marx and Morality (Guelph, Ontario: Canadian 
Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1981), p. 179n. 
53 
to be kept in mind that the sale of the individual's 
labour-power plays the major role in man's life and 
development in capitalist society. Marx does allow for 
an aspect of individual discretion to decide on how the 
individual lives and develops. With reference to McMurtry's 
position, the extent of that discretion is open to 
interpretation but it does present a realm of motivation 
in individual thought and action in Marx's Das Kapital 
although Marx doesn't outline the extent of that realm. 
The motivations, however, of any individual have to 
support the position that, despite the specific 
importance of the sale of the individual's labour-power, 
individuals are able to decide on a definite area of 
non-interference or freedom from the inequities 
that capital creates. In what follows I shall argue 
that capital itself provides the rationale for 
individuals to be motivated to be free of its 
interference. 
Capital, simply put, is a surplus which arises 
in production out of the dealings of workers or labourers 
and the owners of capital, who in some earlier stage of 
production accumulated capital independent of their 
54 
dealings with workers. 42 Capital is that 
something extra which is gained on each transaction 
as the owner of capital emerges with more money 
from his dealings with labourers than he has paid 
out, primarily because he hasn't paid the labourers 
full value for their.labour in production. 43 
This surplus is used over and over to make more 
money which turned into capital repeatedly re-enters 
production. 44 Nonetheless, the basis of the money 
that eventually is turned into capital is the labour 
which creates it. 45 The basis, therefore, of the 
continued creation of capital is labour-power. 
Most of Das Kapital deals with the vast majority 
of people who comprise society as labourers but whose 
labouring condition is dictated to them by the over-
riding consideration of the accumulation of capital. 
Marx admits that the "limits of this book compel us to 
concern ourselves with the worst paid part" of the 
labouring population, and his analyses refer specifically 
42DK., p. 534. 
43.b"d 
1 1 . ' pp. 166ff.' 476ff. 
44.b.d 
1 1 . ' p. 150. 
4S.b.d 
1 1 . ' p. 97. 
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to the horrendous squandering of labour and the servitude 
of labour to capital in nineteenth century Europe, 
especially England, where such squandering and servitude 
take their "classic form". 46 He is especially critical 
of the situation where men, women, and children have to 
work together in the worst of conditions for fourteen, 
sixteen, or eighteen hours a day, every day, for only a 
bare subsistence income during the unfettered advance of 
47 capitalism up to the mid-nineteenth century; and, where 
48 the mass of agricultural workers are torn from the land. 
The consequence of the misery and exploitation of the 
industrial and agricultural workers on all of society is 
accomplished solely for the sake of the accumulation of 
capital, a power which rules their lives although they 
are the creators of that power. 
It shouldn't be inferred that it is only the 
workers who are subservient to capital. The capitalist 
or owner of capital fares no better only the degree of 
subservience is different. Marx says that the capitalist 
"is but one of the wheels" of the social mechanism of 
. 1" d . 49 cap~ta ~st pro uct~on. Accumulation of capital and 
46.b.d ~ ~ . ' pp. 611, 670. 
47 ib"d 
- ~ . ' PP· 223ff. 
48.b.d ~ ~ . ' PP· 630ff. 
49.b.d ~ ~ . ' o. 555. 
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the corresponding competition amongst capitalists that 
must accompany such accumulation make "the immanent 
laws of capitalist production to be felt by each individ-
ual capitalist, as external coercive laws." 50 "To 
accumulate," Marx says, "is to conquer the world of social 
wealth, to increase the mass of human beings exploited 
by him In the process the capitalist remains 
under the sway of capital and he can only perpetrate the 
. . 1 f . d 1 . . 52 v~c~ous eye e o m~sery an exp o~tat~on. 
Marx often contrasts his political economic theory 
with the views of other writers on the nature of capital. 
Throughout Das Kapital he is critical of those theories 
that are based on the belief that capital-dominated 
society "is in fact the very Eden of the innate rights of 
man [that] both buyer and seller of a commodity ... 
are constrained only by their own free will." 53 Marx 
attacks the view that people are brought together in 
capitalist society because of "selfishness, the gain and 
private interests of each." 54 Marx doesn't believe in 
the eventual outcome of such a position where capitalism 
is said to operate "in accordance with the pre-estab-
lished harmony of things, or under the auspicies of an 
50.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. 555. 
51.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. 555. 
52.b"d ~ ~ . ' P· 555. 
53.b"d ~ ~ . ' P· 172. 
54.b"d ~ ~ . ' p. 172. 
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all-shrewd providence", and that people "work together 
to their mutual advantage, for the common weal and in 
the interest of all." 55 In Marx's opinion part of the 
position of proclaiming a 'pre-established harmony' is 
the view that there is a permanent status of two groups 
of people: "one, the; diligent, intelligent, and, above 
all, frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending 
their subsistence, and more, in riotous living." 56 
Marx describes such views to be based on the belief that 
society is composed from its inception of two groups: 
those who accumulate wealth and those who have nothing 
57 to sell but their labour-power. 
Marx says of the relation of workers to owners of 
capital that 11 Nature does not produce on the one side 
owners of money or commodities, and on the other men 
58 possessing nothing but their own labour-power." He 
explains that such a relation "is clearly the result of 
a past historical development, the produc·t of many 
economic revolutions, of the extinction of a whole series 
of older forms of social production." 59 Capital simply 
provides a "new epoch" in production which has as its 
55., . d 
~ D~ • ' p. 172. 
56.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 667. 
57.b;d ~ - . ' o. 667. 
58.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. 166. 
59.b.d 
)_ ~ . ' p. 166. 
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basis the distinction of the workers as wage-labourers 
and the owners of the means of production and subsist-
60 
ence who buy that labour-power. Marx attacks any 
suggestion that the rich and the poor are in a static 
social situation, that there is a social hierarchy that 
the rich will remain rich and the poor will be poor 
forever. Such ideology doesn't represent the reality 
of capitalism, a situation of exploitation and 
subservience. 
Marx implies in his discussion of capital and its 
interference that capital has to be controlled by the 
individuals who create it for they shouldn't he 
Controlled by ;t. 61 Th t . d l . h" . t" t" L _.a ~s, un er y~ng 1s ~nves 1ga ~on 
of capital is the specific and immediate demand that 
individuals be free of, or not be interfered by, capital. 
Capital requires two particular classes or groups of people: 
those who work only for the means of subsistence - the 
workers or labourers, and those who accumulate capital 
b l . . h h k h . 1· 62 Th y exp o~t~ng t ose w o wor_ - t e cap~ta ~sts. _e 
specific area of non-interference is the non-interference 
of individuals from "the capitalist mode of production and 
the final abolition'' of any class or social distinction 
60.b"d l ]_ . ' P· 167. 
61.b"d ~ ~ . ' P· 172. 
62.b.;r:l 
,_ ..... . ' p. 542. 
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by overthrowing the power of capital, and the class 
distinction resting on it; and, creating only one class 
of people - those who work and share the benefits and 
burdens of their work. 63 The crux of Marx's position 
is that both classes as they are constituted under 
capital ism have to be done away in order for the domin-
ation of capital to cease and for individuals to be free 
of capital, for neither the capitalist nor the labourer 
is free of the interference of capital. 
64 both subservient to its sway. 
Capital makes 
Capitalists, as a whole, apparently are in a more 
disadvantageous posir.ion to realize the ill effects of 
capital domination~ although capitalists could argue 
that they are free in capitalism and the more capital 
they accumulate the more free they become. According to 
Marx the opposite situation develops for they aren't 
free of the power of capital and they become less free 
65 the more capital they accumulate. Marx, therefore, 
claims that the major impetus for change from the 
interference of capital has to come from those who sell 
their labour-power because in their daily lives they 
realize more than the capitalist that "the one evil of 
63.b"d 
l ~ • ' 
64.b;d ~ .L • ' 
65.b"d ~ ~ . ' 
p. 26 
pp. 151, 174. 
p. 555. 
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capitalist production is capital itself." 66 It is the 
authority of capital that has to be curbed immediately 
and it isn't only capital but all of production has to 
be placed in the hands of those who work. 67 
D. Non-Interference from Capital 
I shall conclude this chapter by contrasting 
the positions of Berlin and Marx with respect to non-
interference, and by presenting various examples which 
explain how individuals in capitalist society are 
motivated to be f~ee of the interference of capital. 
It is part of Berlin's conception of an individual 
that he has to have boundaries of non-interference and 
that society has to protect that area. He doesn't set 
those boundaries although he says that every individual 
has the need of an area of non-interference. 68 The 
limits of non-interference, Berlin claims, "are 
accepted so widely, and are grounded so deeply in the 
actual nature of men as they have developed through 
history, as to be, by now, an essential part of what 
we mean by being a normal human being." 69 
66.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. 528. 
67
·b·d 496 ~ ~ ., P· . 
68 FEL., p. lxii. 
70 ibid.' p . 165. 
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Marx's position in Das Kapital doesn't limit 
freedom in the negative sense to Berlin's interpretation 
of non-interference. He doesn't dispute explicitly that 
one should have an area of non-interference but Marx tries 
to find the root causes of where one would want to inter-
fere with another and thereupon to formulate an all-
encompassing boundary of non-interference so as to 
curb that root defect. Marx's position implies that 
individuals are in need of a more definite and immediate, 
clearly defined, area of non-interference or freedom from 
one specific, but socially all-embracing confinement, and 
that confinement is capital: and, he allows for an expanded 
consideration of negative freedom where individuals are 
motivated towards the removal of tne confines of capital. 
Marx offers specific examples where individuals 
are effecting change in society and these actions are 
motivated by the consequences of the confines of capital, 
and further motivation to be free of those confines. 
His examples fall into two broad categories. First, he 
says that workers provide a greater awareness amongst 
themselves by their strength in numbers and this 
allows them to work within the system of capital 
domination to seek immediate changes from such domination. 
Second, the disastrous effects of the motion of capital 
are felt initially by the mass of working people, but 
62 
through the ability of some individuals who are able to 
conceptualize the misery and exploitation of capitalism, 
there develops a critique of capitalist practice and 
theory that helps to bring about a more universal under-
standing amongst all individuals that they have to be free 
of the confines of capital. The following examples will 
explain that the underlying rationale in Marx's discussion 
of capital is that individuals have to be free of its 
interference; that the movement of capital in society is 
such that individuals in their daily lives encounter the 
obstacles that capital poses to their existence, and, as 
well, motivates them to be rid of that interference on 
their existence. In effect I maintain that Marx suggests 
that there are individual approaches which individuals 
adopt in order to lessen the devastating influence of 
capital on their lives. 
1 
One particular expression that lends support 
for the capacities of individuals to want to be free of 
the confines of capital involves a consideration of the 
well-known expression of the Communist Manifesto 
"working men of all countries, unite" within the context 
63 
f D K . 1 70 o as ap~ta . (A similar wording of this expression 
is inscribed in red on the inside page of Das Kapital 
published by Progress Publishers and from which 
references for this thesis are made.) It is through such 
action that workers appreciate the strength they have to 
change society dominated by capital, and the similar 
position of exploitation and subservience that workers 
share under the domination of capital. 
Marx explains that workers protect themselves 
against the gross inequities of the capitalist system 
by grouping together and forming themselves into a 
unified class or group of workers, and thereby working 
within the capitalist system to correct it. 71 Workers, 
Marx explains, must put their heads together, and, as a 
class, compel the passing of a law, an all-powerful 
social barrier that shall prevent the very workers from 
selling, by voluntary contract with capital, themselves 
and their families into slavery and death." 72 Marx 
illustrates one achievement of such collective action 
in his day where "the gradually surging revolt of the 
working-class compelled Parliament to shorten compulsorily 
70 McLellan, Marx, p. 246. 
71 DK. . DD. 2 8 5 I 6. 
- - >. . 
72.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. 285. 
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the hours of labour." 73 The drive to set in motion such 
acts of Parliament is only part of the long struggle 
which workers undertake in order to correct the gross 
injustices of capitalism, and in the struggle they use 
whatever tools are at their disposal, including an 
expansion of their immediate legal rights under capitalism 
for "the removal of all legally removable hinderances" 74 
in order to ensure their survival in society, and to 
advance the cause of a more humane development of society. 75 
Although it must be rr.entioned that class is a term which 
Marx never fully clarifies, he does say that the future 
form of society will be "more brutal or more humane, 
according to the degree of the development of the 
working-class itself. !! 76 1t can only be assumed that the 
major part of that development is the concerted effort 
by workers as a group, or class, to initLate . such 
acts of Parliament that reduce hours of work and 
improve the conditions of workers and their families as 
an immediate consideration to improve their situation 
under the domination of capital. 
73 ibid. ~ p. 386. 
74.b.d ~ ~ ., p. 20. 
75.b.d ~ ~ . ' pp. 223ff. 
76.b.d ~ ~ ., o. 460. 
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Marx offers another example of the motivation of 
workers in the sE:ction on :!Piece-Wages". He explains 
that the capitalist lowers wages but doesn't lower the 
price .of the goods produced for resale although the 
time it takes to produce such goods is substantially 
less because of labour intensification. The worker, 
Marx says, "revolts" against such a move and insists that 
his wages shouldn't be lowered while the capitalist's 
profits expand to consume the difference. 77 
Marx extends his treatment of the exploitation of 
individuals in capital-dominated society in order to 
propose steps that they could initiate within the 
capitalist system and these steps would reduce the 
interference on individuals in their immediate situation. 
He proposes "a very different scope for the employment 
of machinery" which isn't controlled only by a profit 
motive. 78 Education should "combine productive labour 
with instruction and gymnastics" and not be a factory-
type work situation where children work twelve to 
eighteen hours a day, and it shouldn't only be monotonous 
instruction. 79 Production methods should change from 
the simple but harsh one-job assembly-line roles where 
individuals are "crippled by life-long repetition of 
77.b'd ~ ~ . ' P· 523. 
78.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. 371n. 
79.b.d ~ ~ . ' o. 454. 
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one and the same operation" to newer methods that will 
fit the individual "for a variety of labours, ready to 
face any change of production." 8° Furthermore, Marx 
proposes that women and children have to take up newer 
roles in industry, for changes in production will result 
in changes within the traditional family structure. 81 
And, probably most importantly, the purpose of an 
industrial reserve army or vast numbers of unemployed 
and unemployables should be discarded because the total 
work of society should be shared by "all the able-
bodied members of society." 82 
Marx often refers to the necessity for society 
to change existing work habits and methods. In 
particular he says that under capitalism the work-burden 
is unevenly divided for the labourer who does the work 
is hindered from "giving free scope to his natural and 
acquired powers." 83 Although Marx doesn't expand on 
the nature of these 'powers' he suggests in various 
passages that the individual should be free of the 
constraints which hinder him from doing things which 
80.b"d ]_ ]_ ., p. 458. 
81.b"d ]_ ]_ ., P· 460. 
82.b"d ]_ ]_ . . ' p. 496, pp.596ff. 
83.b"d ]_ ]_ . ' p. 458. 
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ld 1 h . . h b . 84 wou comp ement _ 1s ex1stence as a uman e1ng. 
It is Marx's view that capitalism wastes a lot of people's 
energy that could ot~erwise be used to satisfy man's 
physical and social needs. 85 Marx wants more free time 
for the intellectual and social activities 
of individuals which would occur once the total work 
of society is more evenly divided, although he comments 
that the extent of the free time necessary to satisfy 
man's "intellectual and social wants" would be 
" d. . d b h 1 f . 1 d " 86 con 1t1one y t e genera state o soc1a a vancement. 
The improvement, therefore, of the conditions in which 
the worker works wichin capitalism would allow for such 
a general state of social advancement, and individuals 
would have more time to call their own and do the things 
they want if the total work of society is more 
evenly distributed. 
11 
Immediate steps towards the complete non-
interference f r om capital aren't solely the concern of 
the workers, although they are in the most immediate 
need for non-interference because of the misery and 
84.b.d 1 1 . ' pp. 454~ 582. 
85.b.d 1 1 . ' P· 223. 
86.b.d 1 1 . ' pp. 223, 496. 
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exploitation of capital. At present there are a few 
representatives of capitalism who see the need for change) 
and these few who do have an important role to play, 
particularly the factory inspectors and ohilosophers 
who help broadcast the inhumanity of capitalism and 
disclose tne mystery of capitalist theory. One can 
gather from Das Kapital that such individuals help focus 
the awareness of exploitation in capitalism and help 
formulate or conceptualize into reports and programmes 
of action what workers only feel or experience. Marx 
singles out the moral integrity of those "men as competent, 
as free from partisanship and respect of persons as ... 
· the English factory-inspectors, her medical reporters on 
public health, her commissioners of inquiry into 
exploitation of women and children, into housing and food." 87 
Another example Marx gives of a capitalist 
representative who sees the need for change from 
caoital domination in society is Robert Owen whom Marx 
describes as one of the first theorists of capital "to 
throw down the gauntlet to the theory of capital."88 
Marx praises Owen's co-operative movement as initiating 
factory acts that have benefited workers and their families. 
87.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
88.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
p. 20. 
p. 283. 
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Then, of course, there is the example of Marx and 
his friend and collaborator Frederick Engels who attempt 
to make people aware of the changes that occur and are 
constantly happening in society. Marx not only sets out to 
explain changes in cupitalism by uncovering and disclosing 
how capital operates in society, but in Das Kapital he 
makes the position of capital "more accessible to the working-
class" which he says is "a consideration which to me out-
weighs everything else."89 Although Marx says that no nation 
can "clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, 
obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal 
development," he qualifies his remark with the suggestion 
that "it can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs" by uncov-
ering the course of that movement and working within it to 
change it. 90 It is inferred from these remarks that 
individuals have to be more a\t.Jare of the development of 
society so as to be able to improve their situation. Other-
wise they could continue to accept that they are under a 
continuous 'normal development' which according to Marx 
is what the ideology of capitalist economics whould have 
people believe capitalism to be - a static and permanent 
normal develooment. 91 
89;b·d 
...._ ~ . ' p . 30. 
90.b.d ~ ~ . ' P· 20. 
91.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. 20. 
CHAPTER THREE 
MARX AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
A. Marx and Positive Freedom 
The discussion in the previous chapter of the 
contemporary formulation of the traditional notion of 
negative freedom by Berlin is used as a framework to 
explain Marx's concern for freedom from interference by 
capital. In my opinion Marx's consideration of freedom 
advances beyond the positions of Berlin and Taylor on 
the question of negative freedom for Marx explains that 
individuals have to be free of the interference of capital 
as a specific area of non-interference, and that individuals 
are motivated towards correcting the inequities that capital 
creates. It remains for me to discuss the relation of Marx's 
philosophy to Berlin's notion of positive freedom. 
Berlin argues that authority as it is exercised 
in society has to be curbed while proponents of a 
positive theory want authority to be placed in their 
own hands. Berlin downplays the place of social 
authority in respect to individual freedom for he suggests 
that the individual is the best authority when it comes 
to one's freedom. "To strive to be free," Berlin explains, 
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1
'is to seek to curb interference, exploitation, enslave-
m~nt by men whose ends are theirs, not one's own." 1 
Berlin places the major emphasis on negative freedom 
because ''it leaves more paths for individuals or groups 
to pursue; positive liberty, as a rule, opens fewer 
paths .... " 2 Berlin does qualify his position by the 
view that freedom in either a negative or positive sense 
can't be an absolute cri~erion of freedom because 
"things being as they are, we are compelled to adjust 
claims, compromise, establish priorities, engage in all 
those practical operations that social and even individual 
l . f h . f l . d" 3 0 l B l . ~ e Las, ~n act, a ways requ~re . ne examp e er ~n 
offers of this is with the universality of education 
4 
allowing greater freedom. It is with particular 
reference to this example that G.A. Cohen in his essay 
"Capitalism, Freedom and the Proletariat" suggests 
Berlin compromises his demand for the 'absence of obstacles 
to possible choices and activities' with the conditions 
5 for greater freedom. 
Although Berlin suggests that the confusion of 
freedom with other values or the conditions of freedom 
generally leads to less freedom, Cohen argues that 
1 FEL., p. lvi. 
z-:--b. d lv; ; . J_ ~ • ' p. .1... ..L 
3
·b"d l . ~ ~ • ' p • X~ • 
4
· b"d l" .. ~ ~ ., p. ~~J_. 
5 G.A. Cohen, "Capitalism, Freedom .:end the Proletariat'', 
The Idea of Freedom, ed. Alan Ryan (Oxford University 
Press, 1970), p. 13~ 
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freedom isn't necessarily renuced by enhancing other 
values, and he uses the example of economic security. 
Cohen claims: "t..Jhen a man's economic security is enhanced 
there typically are, as a result, fewer 'obstacles to possible 
choices and activities' for him ... , and he therefore 
typically enjoys more individual freedom." 6 With 
particular reference to Be~lin's illustration of a 
universal, uniform education allowing for the eventual 
enhancement of greater liberty for all, Cohen offers the 
following criticism of Berlin's position: 
my criticism of Isaiah Berlin respects his 
distinction between liberty and the conditions 
for it ... , of which economic security is one. 
I do not say that economic security is liberty, 
but that typically, and certainly inthe context 
of BErlin's comment, it causes liberty to 
increase, just as equality in education (also 
not a form of liberty) does to take Berlin's 
own example .... 7 
Such criticism is directed by Cohen against those who 
support the position that individual freedom is enhanced 
with capitalism - a position supported by Berlin. 
"They see," Berlin argues, "the freedom which is 
intrinsic to capitalism, but they do not notice the 
unfreedom which necessarily accompanies it."8 
Both Cohen and Berlin suggest that any theory of 
6
'b'd l l ., p. 13n. 
7.1-..'d l •Jl • ' p. 13n. 
8
'b"d ~ ~ . ' pp. 10/1. 
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freedom has to allow for the condition for its exercise, 
and they agree that freedom shouldn't be confused with 
those conditions. They disagree, however, as to the 
social form in which freedom is to be exercised. 
Cohen, on the one hand, explains that capitalism 
doesn't necessarily "imply any greater freedom for 
individuals. 9 He doesn't expand his argument to 
incorporate discussion of the appropriate social 
form in which greater freedom is to be realized 
although he concludes his essay with a Marxist 
overtone when he remarks that the proletariat is a 
vehicle for liberation from class-dominated capitalist 
society. 10 Berlin, on the other hand, attacks those 
theories, especially the one set forward by Marx, 
which lend themselves to support of totalitarian regimes 
that dictate the exercise of freedom. Berlin maintains 
that the social form of capitalism allows for 
11 greater freedom. 
I suggest that Marx's account of freedom respects 
the distinction made by Berlin that individuals have 
the capacity to choose different courses of action as 
they set out to live their lives. 
9
·b"d l l • ' 
lO.b.d 
l l • ' 
ll.b.d 
l l • ' 
p. 15. 
p. 25. 
pp. xlvi/ii, 172. 
It shouldn't 
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be assumed, though, that Marx posits a particular 
form of society in Das Kapital which should be 
established so as to create the conditions for 
greater freedom and where individuals have to 
follow one particular path of social development, 
for example totalitarianism, in order to realize 
a certain goal of greater freedom. It is 
confusion and misinterpretation on this point 
which leads Berlin to discredit Marx because 
coercive theories and actions, where individuals 
have to follow one path of development, have been 
based on particular interpretations of Marx's philosophy. 
As Taylor implies Marx shouldn't be blamed for the 
totalitarian excesses of this century, and a 
clearer presentation of Marx's position in 
Das Kapital with respect to social change, which 
allows for the exercise of greater freedom, should 
allow for Berlin's criticism of Marx's philosophy 
to be discredited as an inadequate grasping of 
what Marx said. 
The task of this chapter will be to clarify 
the confusion which surrounds Marx's remarks about 
reform and revolution as vehicles for social change. In 
particular dialectics has often become the sole 
75 
interpretation of social change in Marx's philosophy. 
I shall argue, however, based on my interpretation of 
Das Kapital that both reform and revolution play a part 
in how Marx conceives of social change, and that dialectics 
can't be accepted as an all-embracing law to explain 
such change. The first step, then, will be to discuss 
Marx's use of dialectics. 
B. Marx and Dialectics 
The dialectics with which Marx is acquainted is 
that originally proposed by Hegel . . Some of the prominent 
features of the complicated nature of Hegel's use of 
dialectics are explained in the following passages. 
Hegel has "a vision of Dialectic as the universal and 
irresistible power before which nothing can stay, however 
secure and stable it may deem itself."12 He explains 
how society, the highest embodiment being the state, comes 
13 to be what it is by dialectical development. 
Society, as well as history, is a resolution of the 
conflicts and contradictions that one can find embedded 
in the history of society. Society is what it is and 
12G.W.F. Hegel, Logic, trans. William Wallace 
(Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 118. 
13G.W.F. Hegel, Philosoph~ of ~ight, trans. T.M . 
Knox (Oxford University Press, 19 6), p. 155. 
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can be no other, although the state as an embodiment 
of society, can resolve itself in a higher form. In 
Hegel's opinion man progressively is more free in the 
society of his day than he has been in any previous 
society for the historical development of society 
contains the emergence of greater freedom for mankind, 
and for Hegel his society reflects such greater freedom. 14 
Hegel's political philosophy and use of dialectics 
are the subjects o£ one of Marx's early unfinished 
critiques written almost twenty-five years before the 
bl . . f D K . 1 15 Th h h. 1 . f pu ~cat1on o as ap~ta . roug out ~s ~ e 
Marx remains a ''pupil of tl}.at mighty thinker" although 
he has a different emphasis on the completeness of 
dialectics as an absolute explanation of the development 
f . t 16 o soc~e y. 
Marx's use of dialectics of society is more 
li~ited than Hegel's account. In reference to Hegel 
during the writing of Das Kapital Marx explains that 
only 11 here and there, in the chapter or. the theory of 
value, [he] coquetted with the modes of expression 
1 . t h. 1117 pecu ~ar o ~m. I suggest that the main reason why 
14 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Phj_losophy, 
'Volume 1', trans. E.S. Haldane (New York: Humanities 
Press, 1963), pp. 49, 99. 
15 DK. , p. 2 9. 
16.b.d 
J. 1. • ' 
17.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
p. 2 9. 
p. 2 9. 
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Marx doesn't engage the constant use of dialectics 
in his work is that he doesn't wish to make it an 
absolute consideration in explaining the material 
world because there are too many variables in 
·having a complete explanation. Furthermore, Marx's 
account isn't complete for Das Kapital is only part 
f h 1 . f h . f . 1 18 o t e exp anat1on o t e operat1on o cap1ta . 
Such a position, however, doesn't necessarily 
discredit Marx's account of capitalism because he 
doesn't have an all-encompassing dialectical 
explanation. Instead it calls for further 
clarification of what Marx aims to accomplish in 
his investigation of capital and an explanation 
of his position with respect to dialectics. 
My discussion of Marx's aim will not be in 
agreement with any suggestion that Marx has found the 
one and only science of society that has dialectics 
as its basis. The science to which Marx refers isn't 
a science of nature but the social science of political 
19 
economy. It is a science that changes with new 
discoveries and hypotheses, for example, Marx refers to 
the "recent scientific discovery, that the products of 
18.b.d 1 1 ., p. 21 
19.b.d 1 1 . , p. 21. 
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labour, so far as they are values, are but material 
expressions of the human labour spent in their 
production." 20 It is also a science that rests on assumptions, 
for example, Marx treats "the whole world as one nation, 
and assumes tnat capitalist production is everywhere 
established and has possessed itself of every branch of 
industry." 21 Furthermore, it is a science that is 
bound by certain fundamental economic premises, for 
22 23 
example, the law of value, law of diminishing returns, 
d l f l . 24 an aw o popu at1on. 
Political economy was a relatively new science 
25 in Marx's day. Marx contributed substantially to 
the seperation of political economy from its service 
to capitalist production and, hence, a more independent 
field of inquiry into the nature of production developed. 
With respect to Marx's contribution to social science~ 
Berlin remarks in his recently revised biography of 
Marx, Karl Marx: "Even if all its specific conclusions 
were proved false, its importance in creating a wholly 
20.b"d 1 1 • ' p. 21 
21.b"d 1 1 . ' p. 545n. 
22.b"d 
1 1 • ' PP· 77ff. 
23.b"d 
1 1 • ' pp. 474/5. 
24.b"d 1 )_ • ' po. 590ff. 
25.b"d 
1 1 • ' P· 344. 
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new attitude to social and historical questions, and so 
opening new avenues of human knowledge, would be 
unimpaired." 26 Although Marx undoubtably would dispute 
any suggestion that his work was all wrong, he did 
allow for difference of opinion. 27 The implication, 
therefore, is that Marx himself left roorn for variations 
and that he didn't view his investigations and results 
as final explanations. 
Many of Marx's comments on political economy 
are an attack on the ''bourgeoise standpoint" of the 
science of oolit:ical economy, which he says "cries 
out for rectification." 28 One particular example 
Marx offers on the attitude of some political economists 
of his day is with respect to the legal limit of the 
working-day which, Marx argues, develops from the 
protests of the working people. After the working-day 
is established Marx says some capitalist economists 
"proclaimed the discernment of the necessity of a 
legally fixed working-day as a characteristic new 
discovery of their 'science' ."29 
With reference to Marx and his use of dialectics, 
26
rsaiah Berlin, Karl Marx (Oxford University Press, 
1978)' p. 116. 
27 DK. , p. 21. 
28ibid. ·~ p. 553n. 
29
·b·d 280 ~ ~ ., P· . 
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I suggest that there is a problem with interpretations of 
Marx's use of dialectics because dialectics has become 
mystified in a way that is similar to the situation 
which develops in German philosophy after Hegel - a 
situation which Marx ~ttacks. After Hegel, Marx says, 
"dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it 
seems to transfigure and to glorify the existing state 
of things." 3° Correspondingly, after Marx dialectics 
has also become a fashion in Marxist circles for there 
have been those, according to Terrell Carver in his 
book Engels, who have referred to Marx's philosophy as 
'dialectical materialism' and have used it as nthe basis 
of official philosophy and history in the Soviet Union 
and in most countries that declare themselves Marxist." 31 
The categorization, therefore, of Marx's philosophy as 
dialectical has tended to mystify Marx's philosophy, 
according to C. Wright Mills in his book The Marxists. 32 
Ironically, Harx never uses the phase 'dialectical 
materialism' although it has become identified as his 
philosophical method. Engels and other nineteenth and 
30 ibiq.' p. 29. 
31 Terrell Carver, Engels (Oxford University 
Press, 1981), p. 48. 
32c. Wright Mills, The Marxists (Middlesex, 
England: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 128n. 
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early twentieth century Marxisr.s develop the doctrine 
of dialectical materialism as their interpretation of 
M ' . . 33 arx s wr~t~ngs. Carver explains that Marx's discussion 
of dialectics doesn't "venture into the murky realm 
of a causal linkage between natural phenomena and human 
behaviour ceyond a notion that the material conditions 
of production create possibilities for human agency and 
at the same time set limits to what can be accomplished." 34 
Carver's assessment of Marx's application of dialectics 
is based on Marx's comment in the afterword to the 
second German edition of Das Kapital, and it is simply 
that Marx identifies !'a rational dialectic aE.: one which 
includes in a positive understanding of a state of 
. n 35 
affairs an understanding of its negat~on. It is, 
Carver claims, Engels who associates "the dialectic with 
natural laws of motion in nature, motion in history 
and motion in thought." 36 
Marx realizes his position on capitalism by 
investigating, as Heilbroner says in Marxism: For and Against, 
" l . 1 . . . d b 1. f f . 1. " 37 t1e part1cu ar ~nst~tut~ons an e ~e so cap~ta ~sm. 
33 Carver, 
34 Carver, 
35.b.d ~ ~ . ' 
36 •l. .• d ~L)~ •' 
Engels, p. 48; Singer, Marx, p. 31. 
Engels, p. 50. 
p. 50. 
p. 50. 
37Heilbroner, Marxism, p. 94. 
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It is Marx's discussion and dissection of capitalism 
that, for Heilbroner, "has won for Marx his greatest 
f d h . t t . . . 1138 arne an ~s s ranges cr~t~c~sm. Contrary to any 
belief that Marx has the one and only true account of 
capitalism, Heilbroner argues that Marx may have been 
all wrong in his analysis, but despite this there is a 
strength or power to his argument that stands the test 
of time. "I find it imaginable," Heilbroner says, 
"although unlikely that the next century will declare Marx 
to have been completely mistaken on the future course 
of capitalism but as long as capitalism exists, I do 
not believe that we will ever be able to declare that 
he was mistaken in his identification of its inner nature." 39 
The inner nature of capitalism is based on the intense 
accumulation of capital and, through this accumulative 
motion of capital, the society based on it sometime 
will have to change, to collapse and be replaced 
by another social form, "presumably socialism. ,,40 
C. Reform and Revolution 
I now embark on a discussion of how Marx views 
38.b"d )_ ~ . ' 
39.b"d ~ ]_ . ~ 
40.b"d ,_ ~ . ' 
p. 94. 
pp. 9L~/5. 
o. 127. 
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capitalist society and this involves a discussion of 
reform and revolution in how change in the social form 
of capitalism can come about. 
In order to avoid any suggestion that Marx has a 
complete and detailed theory that would see the immediate 
resolution to the c?ange of social form from capitalism 
it is necessary to explain that Marx does have a view of 
capitalist society which, if it follows along the course 
dictated by the centralization of capital, will bring 
about a crisis once the centralization of capital 
41 is complete. It is a crisis embedded within the nature 
of capitalism which is based on the accumulation of 
capital. Once all capital is centralized then it would 
be difficult to accumulate any capital. Consequently, 
there would have to be a new form of society other than 
that based on the accumulation of capital. Such a crisis, 
though is only "in its preliminary stage" in 
Marx's day for an all-embracing crisis 
that would end the reign of capitalism would 
require, according to Marx, both the "universality" or 
complete domination of capital, and the "intensity" or 
1 1 . . f . 1 1 . 42 comp ete centra 1zat1on o cap1ta accumu at1on. 
Although his position in the Communist Manifesto is 
41 DK, 714/5 pp. . 
42 ibid., p. 29. 
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more radical, Marx doesn't propose in Das Kapital that 
capitalism has reached the position where the crisis is 
immediate, but that a crisis will occur if capitalism 
follows the path of its development as evident in 
nineteenth century Europe, especially England. Marx's 
position on the imme?iate and inevitable revolution 
to replace capitalism is less immediate and less inevit-
able in Das Kapital than his earlier statements. Berlin 
says in Karl Marx that Marx's "belief in the proximity, 
even in the ultimate inevitability of a world 
revolution, diminished" in Marx's mature work. 43 
There are two positions which have evolved from 
interpretations of social change in Marx's writings. 
Mills contrasts these two views in The Marxists. He 
interprets Eduard Bernstein's philosophy of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as basing his 
position of the evolution of a future form of society on 
the eventual demise of capitalism. "Bernstein's legal 
and evolutionary socialism contends that a socialist 
party enrolling a major section of the electorate and 
linked with trade unions and cooperatives can achieve 
socialism within a democratically constituted polity 
by use of constitutional means - that is, without a 
43 B 1· M er 1..n, arx , p. 183. 
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revolution."44 Reform, then. and not revolution is 
the key to Bernstein's understanding of social c~ange 
from capitalism. Mills says of Bernstein's position: 
t'The revolution could wait, and the notion of the inevit-
ability of a gradual drift toward a socialist society 
served to shore up hopes while waiting."45 This 
position is in contrast to those, for example, of V.I. 
Lenin and Leon Trotsky who p r omote the need for revolution 
and a vanguard to lead the revolution. 46 Both tbe 
reformists and the revolutionaries, Mills suggests. 
47 justify their positions with reference to Marx's philosophy. 
In opposition of the positions of the reformists 
and the revolutionaries as outlined by Mills) I maintain 
that the only solution which Marx offe!:"s in Das Kaoital 
for the comolete eradication of the accumulation of 
caoital is for society ultimately ~o change once the 
accumulation of caoital has all production and all 
injividuals under its sway. The basis of Marx's 
position for the complete eradication of capital~ and 
the form of society based on it , is that capital breeds 
such centralization of capital because of its accumulative 
tendencies that there would be few capi t alists (or, 
44Mills, Marxists, np. 132/3. 
45.b.d ~ ]_ . ' pp. 133/4. 
46.b.d J_ ~ • ' D • 133. 
(_, 7 
; ibid., o. 132. 
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maybe just one capitalist!) left once the centralization 
of capital is complete. "In a given society," Marx says, 
"the limit would be reached only when the entire social 
capital was united in the hands of either a single capitalist 
or a single capitalist company." 48 Subsequently, the form of 
society based on the centralization of capital would lead 
to a new form which would have to come about because 
there would be no more accumulation of capital. 
Marx argues that the change of social form that 
will result once centralization of capital is complete 
would be less "protracted, violent, and difficult" than 
the changes initiated by capitalism from the fifteenth 
century onwards. 49 There are two reasons for this: 
one, "the constantly diminishing number of magnates of 
capital"; and, two, the growing revolt of the workers 
who are "already increasing in numbers, and disciplined, 
united, organised by the very mechanism of the process 
f · 1· d t. ·t lf ~~ 50 o cap1ta 1st pro uc 1on 1 se . 
The long-term consideration which Marx gives to 
the question of social change is that individucals, 
collectively, by their labour-power are taking more and 
more control over all aspects of production; and, with 
48-b"d l l • ' p. 588. 
49.b"d l l . , pp . 71 5 ' 6 6 9 . 
SOibid., p. 715. (The reader is referred to the 
earlier sect1on "Marx and Individual Motivation", pp. 49ff., 
for the perspective of this thesis on the deterministic 
overtone of these statements.) 
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the gradual reduction in the number of capitalists 
through competition to accumulate more capital, more 
and more individuals are taking direct control of 
production. 51 Somewhere, however. along the path of the 
accumulation of capi~al the point will be reached where 
the power of the few (or one!) remaining capitalists 
52 
will have to be usurped by the mass of working people. 
This is the crisis of capitalism, and thus Marx highlights 
the aspect of revolution! Marx's consideration of 
revolution is only briefly mentioned in Das Kapital for 
tbe thrust of his analysis is to explore what ha!-Jpens 
with capital in scciety and to explain that society 
based on capital isn't a permanent form of society, 
no more than earlier forms, for example feudalism. 53 
His major emphasis is to expose what capital does in 
society and to explain what would haopen if it continues 
along its tendency, evident up to the nineteenth 
century, to accumulate more and more. 
Within Marx's discussion of revolution lies tbe 
source of much confusion as is evident in Berlin and 
Taylor. In order for revolucion to occur before the 
accumulation of capital is complete individuals who 
51.b.d 
l l . ' 
52.b"r1 l l_. ' 
53.b"d 
l l • ' 
pp. 714/5. 
p. 715. 
p. 713. 
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desire change and have some knowledge of how capital 
operates in society put forward a positive doctrine 
which has to be realized by its adherents. It is such 
a doctrine which Tayler sees as explicit in Marx's 
philosophy and such a doctrine which Berlin criticizes. 
In Das Kapital. however, such a doctrine is neither as 
explicit as Taylor presents nor as positive a theory 
of social change as that which Berlin is quick to criticize. 
Marx's account of capitalism is based on two 
premises. He explains: 11 We, therefore, first of all 
consider accumulation from an abstract point of view 
-i.e., as a mere phase in the actual process of 
production." 54 This is Marx's economic doctrine, but 
it is insufficient in itself for Marx says the movement 
of accumulation requires a second feature or supposition 
which is the history of primitive accumulation 
"preceding capitalist accumulation; an accumulation 
not the result of the capitalist mode of production, 
but its starting-point." 55 With his economic analysis 
and historical support~ Marx attempts to resolve in a 
concise form how the primitive accumulation of capital 
develops into the fully-fledged capitalism of mid-
54.b'd ~ ~ . ' p. 530. 
55 i b id., p. 667. 
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nineteenth century Europe and afterwards to explain 
how the very nature of society based on capitalist 
production should resolve itself in respect to the way 
it has developed up to his time. Marx does say that 
"capitalist production, begets, with the inexorability of 
a law of Nature, its own n~gation" 56 but the question 
is whether such a statement lends itself to a whole-
hearted endorcement of a positive programme for the future? 
Marx argues that the motion of the accumulation 
of capital will eventually cause capitalist society to 
be replaced; and, he suggests that individuals within 
society can "shorten and lessen the birth-pangs." 57 Marx, 
however, doesn't explicitly propose a positive programme 
to be realized by revolution to overthrow capitalism. In 
Das ·Kapital Marx seems to guard against the immediate use 
of revolution because capitalism isn't in the position of 
crisis! Already in his day there are a few who have 
their sights on changing society and they advocate 
the impending change of society or a new form of society 
which will have less misery and exploitation. 58 Such 
proclamations, for Marx, merely underlie his basic 
premise that because of the accumulation of capital 
56.b.d 
1 1 • ' p. 715. 
57.b.d 
l l • ' p. 20. 
58.b.d 
1 1 • ' p. 21. 
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"the present society is no solid crystal, but an organism 
capable of change, and is constantly changing." 59 Marx 
cautions, however, that the proclamations of those who 
advocate change "do not signify that tomorrow a miracle 
will happen." 60 
Marx's earlier works, especially the Communist 
Manifesto, are more along the lines of a positive 
programme to shorten the transition of a change from 
capital-dominated society, but in Das Kapital Marx 
seems to steer clear of such a position and merely to 
expose the eventual f~ilure of capitalism to be a 
nermanent form of society. It shouldn't be inferred, 
however, that the position of this thesis presents a 
line of argument that is allied to Bernstein's position, 
as Mills presents it, where individuals can adopt a 
'wait and see' attitude, work within the existing legal 
and social structures of capitalism to create changes for 
the benefit of the mass of workers and their families, 
and eventually the conflicts within capitalism will be 
resolved in a more socialized existence. Although 
Marx says capitalism has to have "the entanglement of 
all people in the net of the world-market'' 61 before it 
satisfies the conditions necessary for it to change, 
59.b.d ~ ~ ., p. 21. 
60 ibid., p. 21. 
61 ibid., pp. 714/5. 
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it is questionable whether all of mankind has to go 
through the excesses of capitalism before change occurs. 
Marx does say that somewhere along the path of capital 
62 accumulation a revolution has to occur ; and, the danger 
which Marx undoubtably is aware of is that it may never 
occur if individuals just wait for such a revolution 
to happen. Marx doesn't discount the fact that violent 
revolution may have to be used as a lever to unify 
workers and capitalist representatives who desire change 
of social form or even immediate changes from the gross 
inequities of capitalism. For example, Marx compliments 
the advantage of the February 1848 revolution in France 
which results in "the same limit to the working-day in 
all shops and factories without distinction, whilst 
English legislation reluctantly yields to the pressure 
of circumstances, now on this point, now on that, and 
is getting lost in a hopelessly bewildering tangle of 
contradictory enactments." 63 In another passage, a footnote 
reference to the Communist Manifesto, Marx suggests that 
revolution has the feature of sharpening the distinction 
between workers and exploiters. 64 The use, therefore, of 
revolution will allow individuals to assess their 
situation in capital-dominated society and their position 
with resoect to social change. 
62.b.d ~ ~ · . ' p. 715. 
63.b.d ~ ~ . ' p. 284. 
64.b.d ~-, o. 715. 
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Indeed, in the light of the comments on 
revolution, my argument is that Mar~ leaves unresolved 
the question of what ultimately is the course of action 
that individuals should pursue in order to be free of 
the interference of capital. Neither reform nor 
revolution have ultimate value as vehicles of change 
for both have a purpose to serve. 
Marx argues that the eventual result of the accumula-
tion of capital in his day would be for the form of society, 
based on capital, to be replaced, initially, by that 
form of society which will be based "on 
co-operation and the possession in common of 
the land and the means of production." 65 Such a new 
social form, however, isn't the ultimate form of society! 
Although he doesn't discuss in Das Kapital the future form 
of society beyond the stage of 'co-operation', he comments 
that his explanation of "the existing state of things ... 
regards every historically developed social form as in 
fluid movement." 66 Social forms, therefore, constantly 
change and the succeeding forms are entirely different 
from the preceding ones. Capitalism is the case 
under discussion in Das Kapital. 
Because of the way society has developed as a 
6S.b.d 
1 1 . ' 
66.b"d 
1 1 • ' 
p . 715. 
p. 2 9. 
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result of the advance of capital since the fifteenth 
century, workers have become, progressively, more ana 
more deprived of control over how their labour-power 
is used and the products of their labour-power. With 
the advance of capitalism Marx argues that such a 
position will be reversed as those who work will become 
more and more in control of their lives and the products 
of their labour-power. Furthermore, because of the 
advances in society brought about by capitalism it would 
be foolish in Marx's opinion to revert back to an earlier 
form of society, or he says, quoting a contemporary "to 
d . 1 d. . "6 7 ecree unlversa me lOCrlty. Marx says that the 
noticeable change of emphasis in society, especially 
since the beginning of capital ism in the fifteenth century, 
is that production is no longer performed by isolated 
68 individuals but rather by individuals working together. 
Similarly, the future form of society beyond capitalism 
will have to consider how iLdividuals use their labour-
power. Their relation, then, to each other and the form 
of society they will require afterwards will be based on 
that relation and the choices they have at that time. 
67.b.d 
l l . ' 
68.b.d 
l l • ' 
pp. 713/4. 
pp. 713ff. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
MARX'S ACCOUNT OF FREEDOM 
A. Introduction 
Berlin's two-fold account of political liberty 
incorporates the notions of negative freedom and 
positive freedom. He claims that individuals should be 
left with the free determination provided by a minimum 
area of non-interference and the freedom to choose and 
not be chosen for. To this end, Berlin advocates a 
pluralism of values which individuals see as important 
in how they live and from which individuals can choose 
how they live their lives. He is sharp disagreement 
with any belief in a monist position of belief in only 
one absolute principle upon which positive theories 
have developed. Berlin includes interpretations of 
Marx's philosophy amongst those positive theories and 
he says that adherence to such theories over the past 
one hundred years has led to less freedom in society. 
Various commentators have criticized Berlin's 
position and the ljberal tradition upon which it is based. 
The focus of this thesis has been to incorporate 
reservations which certain commentators have of the 
position which Berlin holds into a concerted criticism 
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of that position which proposes that Marx's view 
of freedom can be realized only by adopting a 
positive position. The particular point that has 
been raised is that a positive position isn't 
necessarily the only outcome of Marx's philosophy, 
especially in Das ~apital, and that adherence to 
a strictly positive interprttation of Marx's 
philosophy has blinded some contemporary 
political theorists to the merit of Marx's 
philosophy and the aspects of political liberty, 
including aspects of negative freedom, that are 
incorporated in it. 
Two arguments have been put forward to clarify 
Marx's position in Das Kapital with respect to political 
liberty. First, Marx also proposes free determination 
and the freedom of individuals to choose and not be 
chosen for, but that the area of non-interference in 
the individual's immediate existence in capitalist 
society has to be clearly set out. It has been argued 
that despite the interference of capital individuals, 
through their labour, have the capacity to think and to 
act on their own and that such a position implicitly 
suggests that individuals in capitalist society are motivated 
towards an immediate area of non-interference from 
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capital. Second, it has been argued that the accumul-
ative tendencies of capital will resolve themselves into 
a new fo~m of society if such tendencies continue as 
evident in nineteenth century European capitalism, but 
that such inevitability doesn't lessen the need for 
individuals to initiate change either by reform or 
revolution. 
It is now necessary to expand Marx's discussion 
of political liberty by presenting his account of 
freedom in terms of individual freedom and social freedom. 
B. Individual Freedom 
Marx argues that man labours and fulfills his 
wants through his labour. Within capitalist society 
man's nature is thwarted because he fulfills the wants 
of capital. The interpretation which I offer of Marx's 
view of individual freedom involves the consideration 
of labour as the universal consideration of man's 
condition. Furthermore, individuals can only attain 
the benefits of their labour by exercising the choices 
they have open to them in how they live and work in society. 
Marx suggests that individuals should have non-
interference from caoital because it is capital which is 
the major cause of interference of individuals by 
individuals in capitalist society. Capital advances a 
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society, capita l ism, at the expense of the mi sery and 
exploitation of the vast number of people who work, and 
even those who accumulate capital aren't free of its 
devastating influence. Marx wants to curb the influence 
that capital has over people and make production serve 
the needs of mankind instead of mankind serving the 
needs of capital. 
The rationale which Marx offers on why the influence 
of capital has to be curbed is that greater freedom than 
that presently experienced by people has to be brought about 
in society. Under the sway _of capital the freedoms that 
are proclaimed by the economics of capital become the 
f~eedoms of society, especially those concerned with 
freedom of trade, freedom to amass a fortune, and freedom 
to own this or that. 1 For Marx this view of freedom 
distorts the nature of freedom. The result of such 
freedoms is the interference of others by those who pursue 
the course of such economic freedoms, much to the detriment 
of tbe mass of people in society who have to remain sub-
servient to the dictates of capital. 
It could be assumed that the individual is 
helpless in the face of the powerful sway of capital in 
society. 2 Indeed, there a~e certain proponents of capitalism 
who promote theories which support the capitalist !'mode 
1 DK., p. 172. 
2
'b'd ~ l . ' p. 252. 
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of production as one eternally fixed by Nature for every 
state of society." 3 Marx attacks the suggestion t:hat 
any system of production, and capitalism is the 
particular focus of his arguments, is either permanent or 
has complete control over all segments of an individual's 
life and thought. Despite t~e powerful influence of 
capital, there remains the nucleus of Marx's position 
with respect to how individuals effect change in 
capitalism. The consideration is that individuals 
create capital; or, Marx remarks, "in capitalist 
production, he is governed by the products of his own 
hand." 4 Equally, it is by his own hand, i.e. his labour, 
that he can effect change. Marx's position~ therefore, 
is that individuals have a variety of choices open to 
them in how they will live at present and in the future. 
The basis of the individual's choices is his or her labour, 
that is the actual expenditure of human energy and 
intelligence that is common to each and every individual. 
In the second step of his discussion of the 
distinction of negative and positive freedom, Taylor 
argues that in Marx's v.•ritings the basis to curb i.nterfer-
ence rests on the positive notion of man's 'species-
nature', and not, as I claim, to be based on an expanded 
consideration of negative freedom where individuals 
3
·b·d J, ~ • ' p. 85n. 
4
·b·d ~ ~ . ' P· 582. 
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are motivated by their labour to be free of the 
exploitation of capital. Taylor's position with respect 
to Marx's view of freedom is that freedom is found "in 
Marx's doctrine of man as a species-being who realises 
his potential in a mode of social production, and who must 
take control of this mode collectively.''S Taylor, however, 
offers little elaboration of this comment which is the 
second step of his distinction. 
Taylor suggests that it is the species-life of 
man which motivates individuals in order to be free of 
the confines of capitalism, and that it is tbe realization 
of such an ultimate goal which he argues is Marx's 
position. A difficulty I see in Taylor's interoreta~ion 
is that his account of man in Marx's philosophy rests 
on the notion of 'soecies-being' which appears in Ma~x's 
early and mostly unpublished manuscripts - unpublished, 
that is, in Marx's lifetime- when Marx is heavily 
influenced by Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach. 6 Marx avoids 
extended reference to the expression 'species-being' in 
his later writings, especially the refined work of 
Das Kapital. I believe that it is no mere oversight 
on Marx's behalf but it is part of the refinement of 
his philosophy. I suggest that instead of putting forward 
5 Taylor, "Negative Liberty". p. 181. 
6John Plamenatz, Karl Marx's Philosoohy of Man 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 110. 
100 
the notion of 'species-being' Marx prefers later in life 
to concentrate on the nature of man to labour and what 
happens once he places part of his labour under the 
sway of capital. Although Marx doesn't dispute the claim 
that a long-term goal of freedom may be that all 
men will be one with their species-nature, or that they 
' 
will be equal members of the same species, man, an even 
more important step is that individuals discern by 
their labour that the goal isn't yet evident in their 
present situation under capitalism. In support of 
this claim I refer to a footnote reference Marx makes 
to his earlier Communist Manifesto that 
capitalism has finally forced man to face up 
to the fact of economic domination and 
exploitation. He says: "man is at last 
compelled to face with sober senses his real 
conditions of life, and his relations with his kind." 7 
In their daily lives in capitalist society 
individuals judge that the excesses of capitalism 
have to be curbed. Most individucals satisfy their 
subsistence in capitalism and produce the form of life 
in society through the sale of their labour-power. 
7 
DK., p. 457n . 
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Under the domination of capital their subsistence is 
one of subservience and the form of life is one which 
perpetuates misery and exploitation by that subsistence. 
Their freedom from either subsistence living or misery 
and exploitation is confined by capital. 
Individuals are dissatisfied with the misery 
and exploitation of capitalism and, through their labour, 
they aim to solve the immediate problems of caoitalism 
in the understanding that they will have a fuller and 
more free life if the problems of capitalism are overcome. 
Despite the claim that Marx's philosophy leads to a monist 
position, there is a pluralism that underlies Marx's 
philosophy which takes account of the choices and 
actions undertaken by individuals. It is the situation 
that arises in capitalist society where individuals are 
motivated to overcome the major 
inhibiting influence on their daily lives, namely the 
interference of capital. 
C. Social Freedom 
Social freedom in Das Kapital is the freedom of 
individuals to use their labour-power in a society where 
the benefits and burdens are more evenly divided by the 
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members of that society as opposed to the unequal 
sharing of benefits and burdens in capitalist society. 
Social freedom will change with the changing conditions 
of society but, in any foreseeable social development, 
individuals will have to exercise their labour-power 
in society~ and, how they will use it and the benefits 
they will realize from it will be the concern of 
social freedom. 
Marx's consideration of social freedom involves 
a discussion of a two-fold stage of society's development. 
First, society will change its social form from tbat 
which is dominated by capital accumulation and, second, 
society will continually change its social form again 
and again in the future. Marx's examination in Das Kapital 
discusses the first point although the basis of such a 
position rests on a continually changing social form. 
The immediate consequence of Marx's account of 
social freeaom is for individuals to decrease the amount 
of time they utilize their labour-power in the employ 
of capital and thereby to increase the amount of rest, 
freedom, and happiness, which would come about with a 
shortened working-day. Individuals develop, through 
reform and revolution, a form of society whereby they 
can use their labour-power to satisfy more of their own 
needs and not the needs of capital, or a form of society 
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where capital isn't the ruling principle but "a society 
in which the full and free development of every 
individual forms the ruling principle."8 The underlying 
rationale to any foreseeable change in society is that 
the use of labour-power has to serve another purpose 
in society other than the accumulation of capital. This 
isn't the same position of Berlin~s identification of 
the individual with some ideal which he categorizes as 
the 'social whole' but it is the existence of the 
surplus which labour-power creates to serve the needs of 
society and not just the few owners of capital. 
Marx doesn't say that labour-power will be done 
away with in the form of society after capitalism. On 
the contrary he says that it will remain in the next 
form of society although a different scope will be 
9 
offered for its limited use. In the third volume of 
Capital Marx expands on the specific nature of labour-
power in the immediate future where the "reduction of 
the working-day is the basic prerequisite" for a 
10 greater degree of social freedom. 
"Surplus labour," Harx says, "in some form must 
always remain, as labour beyond the extent of given needs." 11 
8
"b"d 1. 1. ., p. 
9
"b"d 1. 1. ., p. 
555. 
496. 
1
°Karl Marx, Capital 'Volume Three', t~ans. David 
Fernbach (New York: Random House, 'Vintage Books', 
1981). p. 959. 
11.b"d 1. 1. ., P· 958. 
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The progressive development of society from capitalism 
will require that surplus-labour will form a necessary 
basis to the future development of society although 
it will be "combined, in a higher form of society, 
with a greater reduction of the overall time devoted to 
material labour." 12 Social freedom in the next form of 
society will still be based on the necessity of 
individuals to use their labour-power, but labour-power 
will be co-operatively undertaken with the result that 
there will be less expenditure of it by individuals. 
Marx says that such freedom in the next form of society 
can consist only in this, that socialized man, the 
associated producers, govern the human metabolism 
with nature in a rational way, bringing it under 
their collective control instead of being domin-
ated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it 
with the least expenditure of energy and in 
conditions most worthy and appropriate for 
their human nature.l3 
In his work Karl Marx Berlin interprets 
Marx's statements in the above passage to mean that 
freedom from capital-domination is achieved, initially, 
through the reduction of the working-day. He, therefore, 
contrasts freedom in Marx's thought to leisure when one 
doesn't work. In the light of Marx's remarks on 
lZ.b.d 1 1 . , 
13.b.d 1 1 . , 
p. 958. 
p. 959. 
14Berlin, Marx., p. 95 
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Smith's view of labour and labour-power, 
I suggest that Berlin confuses aspects of labour 
and labour-power, for Marx's consideration of freedom, 
in the sense of social freedom, doesn't end with a 
discussion of the reduced working-day. 
Society's progressive development in capitalism 
and in the stage beyond capitalism is through the use of 
surplus-labour. The concern of social freedom, or the 
freedom of individuals in society, will be how surplus-
labour is utilized in both these social forms. Social 
freedom, however, will not be concerned indefinitely 
with surplus-labour. The underlying rationale for 
Marx's account of social freedom, both now and in the 
immediate future, is how the individual has the 
individual freedom to be able to develop or to use his 
or her own labour within and beyond the perspective 
of society's progressive development. Marx says that 
"the development of human powers as an end in itself", 
which begins both beyond the necessity of surplus-
labour and with it as its base, is the "true realm of 
freedom." 15 With reference to the progressive development 
of society, Marx says: 
It is one of the civilizing aspects of capital 
that it exhorts this surplus labour in a 
manner and in conditions that are more advant-
ageous to social relations and to the creation 
15Marx, Capital 111, p. 959. 
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of elements for a new and higher formation 
than was the case undei 6the earlier forms of slavery, serfdom, etc . 
A form of society has its origins in a previous form 
of society although each social form develops differently 
from the previous one. Correspondingly, the 'true realm 
of freedom' will have its origins in how freedom is 
exercised in a previous society although the 'true realm 
of freedom'will develop differently from the type of 
freedom which is based on surplus-labour. 
Marx says that the development of society from 
capital-domination is a progressive development 
towards greater and greater freedom in society. He 
doesn't say that surplus-labour is a permanent condition 
of future forms of society but only for those societies 
which have a progressive development based on the use of 
surplus-labour which both capitalism and the form 
beyond capitalism will have as its basis. Surplus-
labour in both these societies "is needed to keep pace 
with the development of needs and the progress of 
population."17 Marx doesn't discuss the situation 
where the rate of population may stabilize or be reduced 
in the unforeseeable future and the scope which would 
be offered afterwards to surplus-labour and the social 
freedom concomitant with it. 
16.b"d 
1 1 • ' 
17.b"d 
l l • ' 
p. 958. 
p. 958. 
I maintain that the only 
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permanent condition that Marx discusses is the use of 
labour by the individual if he or she is ~o survive, 
but how individuals will labour in some unforeseeable 
future social form isn't discussed by Marx and therefore 
is open to question and interpretation as to what 
he might envision. 
Marx entertains very little discussion in any 
of his writings about the next stage of 'associated 
producers' and nothing about what happens afterwards 
except his comments about constantly changing social 
forms. My suggestion of the situation where surplus-
labour may not be needed in the unforeseeable future 
is based on part of the fragment on freedom and necessity 
published by Engels in the third volume of Capital. 18 
Any interpretation, however, of Marx's statements in 
the third volume of Capital has to be viewed in the 
ligh~ of a difficulty which is brought out by Carver 
in his book Engels. "Up to the present day," Carver 
explains, "Engels's editing of the manuscript drafts left 
by Marx for the second and third volumes of Capital 
has not been scrutinized, because the manuscripts them-
selves, s&id to be in hoscow, have not been available."19 
Until such a time as the manuscripts are studied, it 
18 ibid., p. 953n. 
19 Carver, Engels, o. 44. 
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v.1ill not be know how "Engels conceived 'the bounds of 
editing' his phrase in the preface to the third volume. 11 2Q 
The major emphasis in Das Kapital is on the social 
change from capitalism and the emphasis isn't to what 
social form the change should be made. In the section in 
the opening chapter dealing with the "Fetishism of 
Commodities" Marx illustrates what, in my opinion, has become 
conceived as the positive aspect of his approach in the 
creation of a new social form to replace capitalism. 
Marx alludes to communism in his example of 
the possible future uses of labour-power. He says: 
!'Let us picture to ourselves, by way of change, a 
community of free individuals, caYrying on their work 
with the means of production in common, in which the 
labour-power of all the different individuals is consciously 
applied as the combined labour-power of the community." 21 
The purpose of Marx's illustration is to discuss the sit-
uation whereby the "social relations of the individual 
producers, with regard both to their labour and to its 
products, are ... perfectly simple and intelligible, and 
that with regard not only to production but also to 
d . .b . "22 ]_ str~ ut~on. Although the illustration is based on 
t .he premise that 'all the different individuals' share 
20 ibid., p. 44. 
21DK., pp. 82/3. 
22.b.d ~ ~ ., P· 83. 
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the total labour of society, Marx uses the illustration 
merely in contrasting the example of isolated individuals, 
or the Robinson Crusoes, of other economic theories, and 
not to sug~est that his example is a positive programme 
or definite guide for the future. 23 
Marx doesn't suggest that all individuals 
immediately partake or be forced to partake in the sharing 
of their labour-power. As he argues throughout 
Das Kapital the direction of nineteenth century capitalism 
with its concentration on the accumulation of capital is 
bringing about the co-operation and association of labourers 
Eventually, the situation may be reached whereby there is 
such a 'community of free individuals' where production 
"is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a 
settled olan," 24 but Marx's investigations in Das Kapital 
are less than a positive guide for individuals to realize 
such a plan. The major emphasis in Das Kapital is the 
distortion in Marx's view where "the process of production 
has the mastery over man, instead of being controlled 
by him." 25 
There is the implication that can be drawn from 
Marx's comments that individuals with an understanding 
of society's development can have a better life in 
23.b"d ~ - l ' ' PP· 81, 83. 
Zb,. b. d 
l l . ' P· 84. 
25.b"d l l . , p. 85. 
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society if they just decide to take control of production 
and then plan the future. For this to happen, Marx 
cautions, there has to be "a certain material ground-
k t f d . . f . ,26 wor or se o con 1t1ons o ex1stence. Marx 
doesn't say in Das Kapital that the groundwork has been 
completed in his day. The groundwork, however, is being 
prepared for the replacement of capital-dominated society 
by the motion of capital and the reaction, by reform and 
revolution, of individuals to the inequities that 
capital creates. 
D. Conclusion 
The account of freedom in Das Kapital incorporates 
two aspects of individual freedom and social freedom. 
Marx's discussion of individual freedom centres on the 
freedom of each and every individual to decide on how 
he or she labours in order to survive and, at present, 
it entails freedom from the domination of capital in 
capitalist society, for capital is the main cause of 
interference to the individual's freedom to use his or 
her labour. 
Marx's account of social freedom has to 
consider his position on social change and development 
which follows along the lines of the philosophy already 
outlined by Hegel. For Marx, there is no static or 
26 ibid.' p. 84. 
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permanent form of society but the social form of 
27 
society continually changes. In this respect Marx's 
position is similar to the position where Hegel proposes 
that underlying the movement of society is a progressive 
28 development, an all-prevading spirit in the world. 
That spirit is the spirit of freedom! 
I maintain that for Marx freedom in society 
develops with the progressive development of society. 
The focus of Marx's attention in Das Kapital is that 
greater freedom develops in capitalist society by the 
actions of individuals who either work within the social 
form o~ capitalism to change it or who actively 
encourage a radical change of the social form of 
capitalism. Although the capitalism of nineteenth 
century Europe can only be fully overcome by the complete 
domination of capital in society, the mass of people 
become more united and more exoerienced by the 
movement of capital in society and, thereby, the mass 
of people assumes far greater control over society as 
29 it progresses. Once capitalist society is replaced 
then there will be a further form which society will 
assume afterwards and further considerations of social 
freedom in that form of society. Although these 
27.b;d ~ ~ . ' p. 29. 
28 Hegel, Lectures, p. 19. 
29DK., pp. 714/5. 
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conditions are as yet unknown, they will develop as 
society develops. 
I suggest that the only aspect in Das Kapital 
which Marx entertains on the future form of society 
beyond the next stage of 'co-operation' is that 
individuals will have to continue to use their labour 
to satisfy their needs. The needs will change with the 
changes in society and aspects of man's nature will 
change or develop to meet those needs. The basis, however, 
of those needs and the ability of individuals to fulfill 
them through the actual expenditure of their own energy 
and intelligence will remain a permanent condition of 
human existence; that is, individuals will always have 
to labour in some fashion in order to survive by the 
appropriation of Nature to their own needs in the various 
forms which society assumes. 
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